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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
‘THE EU POLICY GAME’- ‘DISCERNABLE MULTILEVEL INTERACTIONS 
CYCLE’; CASE OF THE EU BIODIVERSITY POLICY IN THE UK 
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M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis,  2007 
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European Union (EU) has entered into a rapid and dynamic integration process 
especially after mid 1980s and this situation has brought many questions in mind 
regarding the changes of Union’s functioning, policy making and implementation 
processes. Whilst this dissertation is closely connected to these questions, main 
discussion point is finding an answer to the question of in which kind of framework 
European Union policy making, implementation and post implementation processes 
function today. The main attempt in the dissertation is to look at the EU from a new 
perspective. In this direction, in the Union, policy making, implementation and post-
implementation processes are functioning in some sort of a system that all the member 
states are (the UK in our example) in contact with all related actors out of the central 
government bodies in order to ensure integration in every EU policy areas (our example 
is biodiversity policy). In conclusion, this new situation is defined in the dissertation as 
‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’. That’s to say, today, in the EU policy 
making, implementation and post implementation processes, different actors play active 
role in various levels with different methods and this circumstances happen in a cyclical 
mode in that a result of one process feeds the other process and this goes on in a chain. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
‘AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ POLİTİKA OYUNU’- ‘GÖRÜLEBİLİR ÇOKLU 
ETKİLEŞİM DÖNGÜSÜ’: İNGİLTERE’DE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ BİOLOJİK 
ÇEŞİTLİLİK POLİTİKASI 
 
 
GÜL MESCİOĞLU 
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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Korel Göymen 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çoklu Yönetişim, Görülebilir Çoklu Etkileşim Döngüsü, Avrupa 
Birliği, Biolojik Çeşitlilik, İngiltere 
 
 
 
 
Avrupa Birliği özellikle 1980’lerin ortasından itibaren hızlı ve dinamik bir bütünleşme 
süreci içerisine girmiş ve bu durum birliğin nasıl işlediği, karar alma ve uygulama 
sistemlerinin nasıl değiştiği sorularını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu tezde ele aldığımız 
konu da bu sorularla birebir bağlantılı olmakla birlikte, asıl tartıştığı konu şu an Avrupa 
Birliği’nde kara alma, uygulama ve uygulama sonrası sistemlerin hangi çerçeve 
içerisinde işlediği ile alakalıdır. Tezde göze çarpan en önemli çaba Avrupa Birliği’ne 
yeni bir pencereden bakmaya çalışmak olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda, Avrupa Birliği’nde 
karar alma, uygulama ve uygulama sonrası süreçlerin, bugün, bir sistem içerisinde 
işlediği farkedilmektedir. Avrupa Birliği üyesi her devlet (örneğimizde İngiltere), 
Birliğin her alanda (örneğimizde Çevresel Çeşitliliğin Korunması) entegrasyonun 
sağlanması konusunda merkezi devlet organlarının dışında her türlü oyuncuyla ciddi bir 
etkileşim halindedir. Sonuç olarak bu durum tezimizde ‘Görülebilir Çok Düzeyli 
Etkileşim Döngüsü’ yaklaşımıyla ifade edilir. Kısaca açıklamak gerekirse, bugün 
Avrupa Birliği politika yapım, uygulama ve uygulama sonrası süreçlerinde, farklı 
düzeylerle farklı aktörler değişik yöntemlerle etkin olabilmekte ve bu durum döngüsel 
şekilde işleyerek, bir sürecin sonucu diğer bir süreci besleyebilmektedir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to reveal current policy making and implementation 
trend in the EU by studying one of the policy areas in the EU, namely the biodiversity 
conservation in one of the Member States of the EU, the United Kingdom (UK). The 
main arguments of the study get inspiration from the multilevel governance approach. 
These arguments focus on the ‘governance trend’ in the EU and the ‘multilevelness’ of 
the policy processes. Moreover, they stress the evident existence of ‘policy cycle’ such 
that all related actors (stakeholders) willingly collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate 
with each other continuously at various levels. They all have a consciousness of the 
importance of this interaction to promote their joint purposes further. In this context, the 
main arguments of this dissertation are: 
1. Multilevel governance approach is a suitable starting point to understand how 
the EU is functioning today and it brings new discussion arena on the roles of 
stakeholders in EU policy game, different from the approaches of macro European 
integration theories, such as liberal intergovernmentalism.  
2. Member States have a consciousness that they have entered a ‘club’ that has 
certain obligations to be a member, so they are aware of the fact that, at least in the 1st 
Pillar (Community issues), there is a necessity to work in cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration with all related actors. 
3. The increasing trend of governance in world politics can not be ignored and the 
EU policy cycle demonstrates the existence of this trend openly. In this cycle, although 
there are power asymmetries between the related stakeholders, central governments 
‘inevitably’ adopt themselves to this trend under the pressure of the membership 
consciousness and world dynamics, in some sort of a ‘learning process’. 
4. Whilst the central governments have learned to take all stakeholders into 
account related to the policies of the EU, on the other hand, subnational entities have 
also learned to exploit all suitable channels to reach their aims, and this learning 
processes can not be turned back. 
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5. More significant than all, this study does not aim to create a new theory or 
approach, but intends to display ongoing philosophy behind the policy process of the 
EU. 
In addition to these, the concept of ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ is 
central to the entirety of the dissertation because it is an attempt to demonstrate this 
newly emerging picture. The aim of using this sort of a concept is not to shape new kind 
of theory, but indicating the existing situation that all Member States are in everyday. In 
one policy area, there are many actors working on this policy and they are all aware of 
their existence. These actors may have differing degrees of power and purposes. 
However, they all come to the same point to work together to reach their own aims. In 
the light of these assertions, our main hypothesis aims to test the impact of Multilevel 
Governance in the UK, an EU member country with a centralized administrative 
tradition, to assess to what extent discernible multilevel interactions cycle is valid. 
Towards this end, the environmental policy area has been selected.  
Today, in the EU, not only EU institutions and Member State governments are 
playing the policy game, but all related non-governmental organizations and sub-
governmental actors are contributing to the game. Their actions have influence on each 
other and therefore not in a linear process, but in a cyclical process one action of one 
actor have impact on other process and actors. This means that pre-decision making 
process affects decision making processes and related actors in these processes affect 
some other actors. Moreover, implementation process affects the post implementation 
processes due to the feedbacks that come from implementations. At these stages again 
same or different actors play roles and they interact with each other. After post 
implementation process, new feedbacks appear and these shape the decisions taken and 
Member States may take new decisions and continue to implement. All these 
interactions happen in a cyclical mode and all stakeholders have to some degrees 
influence on each other at some levels. Therefore, the terms of multilevelness and 
cyclical actions are used for our study. 
Furthermore, there is interaction between all stakeholders due to inevitable 
demand coming from each of them. All central governments and EU institutions have 
learned to work in collaboration, cooperation and coordination because there is no way 
to decide on the policies and take all responsibilities alone. These key actors have 
experienced the efficiency of working together on the policy processes. Therefore, we 
used the term ‘discernible’ to define the general picture of the policy processes in the 
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EU due to the fact that the increasing inclusion of the related actors to the policy 
processes and their influence on the formation of the decisions and implementation can 
be seen easily. The creation of new policies and their implementations display only one 
picture: although the influences of the stakeholders on the policy processes differ 
according to their competencies, EU, today, is completely the picture of multilevel and 
multi-actor based interactions cycle that can be observed easily. In the dissertation we 
will try to testify our hypotheses on ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ and 
determine whether it exists or not.  
In addition to these attempts, in the first chapter of this study, the origins of 
multilevel governance in the EU Studies will be analyzed with brief historical 
background. In order to understand the multilevel governance as an approach inspiring 
our vision in this dissertation, liberal intergovernmentalism will be revisited to 
demonstrate how multilevel governance established itself. It can be asserted that no 
single theory can explain EU governance at all levels of analysis. Trying to devalue the 
broad “macro” theories or approaches of EU integration, such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, to shape this study becomes such a naïve initiative. However, the 
idea that these theories are so powerful theoretical tools for explaining the major 
“history-making” decisions, but they lose their explanatory power on “policy setting” or 
“policy shaping and implementing” areas, can not be ignored.  
In addition, the three main arguments of Hooghe and Marks shaping the 
multilevel governance approach will strongly reinforce our framework of the theoretical 
background. One of these arguments is that, decision making competencies are shared 
by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by national governments. Second, 
collective decision making among states involves significant loss of control for 
individual governments. Third, political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. 
While national arenas remain important for the formation of national government 
priorities, the multilevel government model rejects the view that subnational actors are 
nested exclusively within them. The significant and new contribution of the multilevel 
governance, different from liberal intergovernmentalism, can be seen within its 
emphasis on the crucial role of the connections between the supranational-national-
subnational actors on policy-making and implementation stages. In the end, it is realized 
that, the multilevel governance is more than an approach, but an established philosophy.  
In the third chapter, as the part of environmental policy of the EU, the biodiversity 
policy will be discussed to test some of our arguments in the EU policy making and 
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implementation laboratories. The aim of choosing this policy area is so clear that in 
today’s highly developing industrial world, the business and environmental sector 
relations are so problematic due to their efforts to co-exist in the developmental process. 
Therefore, since economic and environmental clash of interests is so deep and there can 
no more important subject in the world than stopping loss of biodiversity in relation 
with the importance of “Life on Earth”, this study will focus on this policy area of the 
EU. Moreover, this study will stress the increasing number of actors playing the 
biodiversity policy game. In this respect, first of all, a brief history of the policy will be 
mentioned by focusing on EU’s growing attention to this policy area. In continuation, 
current picture of the process and main dynamics of this policy will be discussed 
including the 6th Environmental Action Plan, Biodiversity Strategy,   Biodiversity 
Action Plans, LIFE Nature financial support for these strategies and plans, and as an 
important part of EU legislation on this issue, the Birds and Habitats Directives. These 
dynamics are indeed the main steps to explore which actors play which roles in this 
policy area of the EU. Environmental strategies and action plans are the maps of the 
environmental projects or policy areas that give directions to member states to aim and 
reach the environmental goals of the EU. Therefore, 6th Environmental Action Plan is 
the latest map for the current member states to digest and take the suitable steps to 
implement the biodiversity policy in their countries. In this direction, Biodiversity 
Strategy is the specific strategy area of the EU Environmental policy that is closer to the 
member states’ implementation departments. Biodiversity Action Plans of the Member 
States, therefore, originates from these Strategies. In this chain of policy making and 
implementation, all stakeholders join the process directly or indirectly to reach the 
determined goals in a ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’. 
Consistently, in the fourth chapter, the UK was chosen as a case state for the 
projections of multilevel interactions, decision making processes, and developments 
regarding the EU Biodiversity policy.  This study will try to demonstrate how multilevel 
governance approach affects the power of the central government to control the policy-
making and implementing arena. Although the huge amount of study on the unchanged 
dominant status of the central governments in this country that is originating from its 
centralist background, our aim is to reveal the changing environment in policy-making 
and implementation levels. At this juncture, ‘British political tradition’ will be revisited 
and changing dynamics of this tradition will be mentioned by referring to the effects of 
the local government/non-state actors and the EU Institutions. In addition, one other 
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reason to choose the UK as a case state is that it is commonly associated with the role of 
an environmental ‘Euro-skeptic’. The UK’s opposition to Commission drafts and 
positions of “greener member states” have led to dramatic stand-offs, problematic 
negotiations, and the perception that this state is a ‘laggard’. In the light of these, the 
aim is to stress the importance of multilevel governance as a theoretical framework and 
its impact on the changing nature of the UK policy making and implementation, having 
to take account of all national stakeholders as well as the supranational bodies. 
Therefore, all these discussions will help us to reveal the intricacies of UK’s adaptation 
to EU Biodiversity policy and the implementation style she has chosen. Our analysis 
will start from internal and external dynamics that this member of the EU has. First, the 
Westminster and Whitehall relations, changing role of local governments, and British 
devolution will be revisited. Secondly, the EU membership and the alignment of this 
country with EU environmental governance system will be focused on. Following part 
will integrate the biodiversity policy process into the British political life, and so display 
how connections direct us to see ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ in this policy 
area.  
Our attention in these analyses will focus on the changing relationship between 
central-sub-state/local, central-non-state, and central-supra-state actors in decision 
making and implementation processes. This analysis will contribute to the study in the 
direction that, while multilevel governance has its own limitations as an organizing 
perspective for understanding the changing nature of the British state, it captures 
elements of change and directs our attention to new ways in which the state seeks to 
exercise control in this new context of multilevel interactions cycle.  
Above all, this dissertation is the picture of theoretical and normative study based 
on ‘discernable multilevel interactions cycle’ of EU policy processes. In the entirety of 
the study, the new way of understanding and attempt to demonstrate this will be 
witnessed. The main aim is to look at EU from the perspective of general picture of 
‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ and display one alternative way of seeing EU 
formation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE APPROACH 
‘an inspiration for the general framework’ 
 
 
 
I.1. The Origins of Multilevel Governance: EU Studies 
(brief historical background) 
 
 
 
The EU policy process does not simply occur at the EU level but it penetrates in 
complex ways into national political and legal systems. Thus, in recent years, the term 
‘multilevel governance’ has become commonplace in EU studies to capture the peculiar 
character of EU multilevel interactions cycle. Although not accepted as a theory, the 
main arguments of the multilevel governance approach have been discussed in 
European studies related to its validity to explain the complex web of 
interconnectedness between the European, national, and sub national levels of decision 
making. Moreover, multilevel governance is used to display the drift of institutional 
changes in the European Union which are the turning points in the integration process. 
With these changes, multilevel governance shows how competencies are diffused 
between the interdependent institutions and how these institutions are forced to work 
together automatically in the policy making process with the effect of formal and 
informal checks and balances. 
In looking at the historical background of the creation of this approach, we are 
directed to the mid to late 1980s when the ‘new wave’ of thinking emerged with the 
deepening of the integration process; as a result of governments’ collective willingness 
to complete the internal market, as in the Single European Act (SEA) (1987). The 
Member States have recognized that achieving a single market would require greater 
majority voting (Shackleton 2002:98).  
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In this context, the SEA brought new attention to regional policy, setting up a new 
Title V on Economic and Social Cohesion and arguing that the need to ‘clarify and 
rationalize’ the use of structural funds which were seen as a side-payment to poorer 
Member States (such as Greece, Portugal and Spain). For the anticipated consequences 
of the internal market programme, the national governments agreed to double 
allocations of structural funding to assist the development of disadvantaged regions 
(McCormick 2002:126). Further reforms related to the regional policy and the main 
principles of new reforms were shaped similarly: first of all, funds were formed under 
objectives (like Objective1-2-3 Programmes, EQUAL, INTERREG, LEADER, 
URBAN Programmes etc). Secondly, the Commission (as one of the supranational 
institutions of the EU), Member States, and regional authorities (and/or local) began to 
work in ‘partnership’1 in order to plan, implement and monitor use of the Funds. 
Finally, ‘additionality’ of Community contributions was observed.2 
In addition, more changes related to the regional policy were constructed by the 
Maastricht Treaty, under which Committee of Regions3 were established. This treaty 
enabled the regions, which have autonomous governments with a ministerial structure, 
to represent their states in the Council of Ministers. Therefore, as M. Keating indicated, 
Maastricht was the high point of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ movement in which 
regions sought recognition as a ‘third level’ of European government (Keating 2002: 
214). In summary, this historically established framework, the core of the new wave of 
thinking after the mid 1980s, led scholars especially, G. Marks and L. Hooghe to work 
on multilevel governance approach. This framework of multilevel governance inspires 
our vision in order to shape this study in line with the ‘discernable multilevel 
interactions cycle’ argument to look at the ‘European Union game’. 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 For further information see European Commission Employment and Social Affairs, 
‘The 1988 Reform  of the Structural Funds. New Way of Working, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/esf/en/overview/chapter2.htm 
 
2
 For further information see European Parliament Fact Sheets, ‘Economic and Social 
Cohesion’, 10/08/2000, from  http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_4_1_en.htm 
 
3
 For further information see European Union Committee of the Regions official web 
site from  http://www.cor.eu.int, (23 October, 2006) 
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I.2. Understanding Multilevel Governance 
 
 
 
 
As indicated before, multilevel governance approach is the main inspiration of the 
whole of this dissertation due to its wide perspective stressing on the significance of the 
existence of multilevel, multi-actor based interactions in the European Union policy 
making and implementation processes. In this line, it can be argued that although this 
approach is not fully fledged theory like European integration theories, it still fills the 
empty areas that they couldn’t do before. In the dissertation, multilevel governance 
approach will be discussed after giving the main arguments of liberal 
intergovernmentalism because it will be truly important to see the contributions of 
liberal intergovernmentalism to European studies and than realize where multilevel 
governance approach is settled itself. Another reason that necessitates explaining liberal 
intergovernmentalism at this point is also the common points that this theory and 
multilevel governance approach have regarding the acceptance of increasing numbers of 
actors and multilevel interactions in European politics.  
 
 
 
 I.2.1. Main Arguments of Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is one of the most important political theories that 
explains European integration process and created by Andrew Moravscik. This theory 
can be seen some sort of a reaction against rigid intergovernmentalists that they 
established intergovernmentalism on realist arguments, mainly state centricism, state 
interests, sovereignty, zero-sum game and so on. In line of these, intergovernmentalism 
argued that European Coal and Steel Community could only be thought in the Cold War 
atmosphere, this formation could only be thought as cooperation, not as integration, this 
European cooperation could only be subservient of nation state, and finally this 
cooperation established due to the similar interests of nation states.  
In addition to these, Moravscik has provided more moderate kind of 
intergovernmental vision to explain European integration in ‘Preferences and Power in 
the European Community’ (1993). His arguments was formed around the liberal 
intergovernmentalist arguments that ‘initially presented as a framework for synthesizing 
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theories into a coherent account of large EU decisions taken under unanimity, though it 
can be applied to other types of decisions as well’ (Dinan 2000:280). The theory 
emerged on the idea of negotiated policy coordination between Member States of the 
EU to manage economic interdependence in an intergovernmentalist environment.  
In analyzing Moravscik’s work, the influence of Putnam’s theory of ‘two-level 
games’ (1988) is clearly perceived. Putnam argues that the first game is played within 
domestic realm by explaining how states shape their policy preferences (or national 
interests). The second game, on the international realm, includes the striking of 
interstate bargains. As Rosamond (2000:136) put it:  
 
   Putnam’s core point is that national executives play games in two arenas more or less 
simultaneously. At the domestic level, power-seeking/enhancing office holders aim to build 
coalitions of support among domestic groups. At the international level, the same actors seek to 
bargain in ways that enhance their positions domestically by meeting the demands of key domestic 
constituents. 
 
While the effects of Putnam’s theory show us the arenas in which the nation states 
engage in a co-operation in the context of LI, we can also divide the main components 
of the theory into three. The first argument clearly emerges from the 
intergovernmentalist vision that assumes rational state behavior, which means [that] the 
actions of states are thought to be based on their own ideas on what are judged to be the 
most appropriate means of achieving their goals. As Moravscik demonstrates, 
‘European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders’ (1998:18).  
The second argument is a liberal theory of national preference formation that 
draws on a domestic politics approach. The main proposition is that the state goals can 
be shaped by domestic pressures and interactions that come from the constraints and 
opportunities deriving from economic interdependence. The leading societal factors can 
provoke an international demand for co-operation. As Moravscik has stated: ‘the vital 
interest behind General de Gaulle’s opposition to British membership in the EU…was 
not the pursuit of French grandeur but was the price of French wheat’ (Moravscik 
1998:7).  
At this point, the domestic political process should be analyzed in detail. 
Moravscik demonstrates that ‘state behavior reflects the rational actions of governments 
constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic 
environment’ (1993:474). Therefore, the ‘two level games’ turns to the multi-
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dimensional actors arena in which the preferences of national governments are shaped 
by domestic societal forces, ‘the identity of important societal groups, the nature of their 
interests, and their relative influence on domestic policy’ (1993:483) and also the 
outside environment of international arena, that includes the EU as well. 
As a third argument, one other intergovernmentalist interpretation of ‘inter-state 
relations’ can be mentioned which emphasizes the key role of governments in 
determining the relations between states and sees the outcome of negotiations between 
governments as essentially being determined by their relative bargaining powers and 
the advantages that accrue to them by striking agreements (Nugent 2003: 482). 
Under the light of these components of the LI theory, the two important stages on 
which the decision making process in the EU is shaped by Member States and that each 
of which is grounded in one of the classic integration theories. (Hix 1999:15) In the first 
stage, there is a ‘demand’ for European integration from domestic economic and social 
stakeholders. They have economic interests and compete for these interests to be 
defended by national governments in EU decision making. More clearly, the domestic 
interests should be channeled by the national government to be promoted in the EU.  
In the second stage, supply for the European integration emerges from 
intergovernmental bargains such as Treaty reforms and budgetary agreements. At this 
point, in opposition to the classic realist theory of IR, Moravscik argues these bargains 
can result in positive-sum outcomes due to the fact that the state preferences are driven 
by economic rather than geopolitical interests. Furthermore, state preferences are not 
fixed with the effect of different groups can win the domestic political contest (Hix 
1999:15). 
In addition to these inter state bargaining arguments; Moravscik also does not 
forget to mention the effects of supranational actors on the European integration 
process. LI elaborates the idea that international (European) institutions are established 
to develop the efficiency of interstate bargaining. The agreements are usually reached 
on a lowest common denominator basis, with clear limits placed on the transfer of 
sovereignty to supranational agents. (Cini 2003:103) This argument can be elaborated in 
the wordings of Moravscik that ‘to secure the substantive bargains they had 
made…governments delegated and pooled sovereignty in international institutions for 
the express purpose of committing one another to co-operate’ (Moravscik 1998:3-4).  
Therefore, supranational institutions are established not just for the sake of interests of 
 20 
nation states, but also in favor of a healthier environment in which the bargaining can 
take place and agreements for the integration are developed.  
Consistent with all these, Moravscik (1999) uses to five key episodes in the 
construction of the EU in order to implement his theory to the European integration 
process: The negotiation of the Treaties of Rome (1955-8), the consolidation of the 
common market and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)(1958-83), the setting up 
of the first experiment in monetary co-operation and of the European Monetary System 
(EMS)(1969-83), the negotiation of the Single European Act (SEA)(1984-8), and the 
negotiation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)(1988-1991). 
On the basis of these case studies, Moravscik (1999) concludes in the following 
arguments: preferences of national governments, not the preferences of supranational 
organizations shape the major agreements in favor of Europe. Second, the balance of 
economic interests, rather than the balance of political interests of national governments 
leads to these national preferences. Third, the relative bargaining power of the states 
affects negotiation results and the delegation of decision-making authority to 
supranational institutions points to the willingness of governments to guarantee that the 
commitments of all parties to the agreement would be carried through rather than the 
federalist ideology or a belief in the inherent efficiency of international organizations 
(George and Bache 2001:14). 
In conclusion, Moravscik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory presents a serious 
challenge for competing models that seek to explain the European integration process 
(Rosamond 2000:145). His work should be seen as a strongly useful instrument for 
organizing data and constructing empirical studies. However, because liberal 
intergovernmentalism advances such a clear and, in important respects, almost 
uncompromising framework, and because it is seen by many as just not fitting the facts 
in an era of multiple international actors and complex interdependence between states, it 
has inevitably been exposed to criticism (Nugent 2003:483).  
 
 
 
I.2.2. Main Arguments of Multilevel Governance   
 
 
As mentioned before, this chapter presents liberal intergovernmentalism in 
summary to prepare ground for understanding multilevel governance approach by 
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touching upon their main arguments and displays how multilevel governance has 
established itself.  Moreover, some critics of liberal intergovernmentalism are provided 
due to the fact that critics of liberal intergovernmentalism can help to understand main 
dynamics of multilevel governance approach.  
In this line of thinking, four criticisms are particularly worth noting. First, 
Moravscik is too selective with his empirical references when seeking to demonstrate 
the validity of his framework in the EU context (Nugent 2003:483). More particularly, 
his theory can be applied on the majority of ‘history-making’ decisions (Peterson 1995). 
However, it is not so possible to explain the way in which the EU works in matters of 
day-to-day politics.  
Second, LI focuses too much on the formal and final stages of decision-making 
and generally ignores the informal integration as well as the constraints that such 
integration imposes on the formal decision-makers. Third, the ‘black box’ of the state is 
not analyzed in details and it disaggregates the different parts of government. The 
‘state’ may be broken down into its component parts while related to the policy making 
process in any organization, community, and formation. In addition, it is argued that the 
‘two-level game’ metaphor does not display the reality of EU politics today-and that the 
EU is now much more of a multilevel than a two-level polity (Cini 2003:106). In 
connection with these, the theory doesn’t take the constraints faced by key policy 
makers seriously. That is to say, the effects of supranational institutions such as the 
Commission and the ECJ, and transnational actors such as the firms and interest groups 
in the European integration process are not fully taken into account. Pollack’s analysis 
(1997) demonstrates how, although supranational institutions are inclined to work 
within the boundaries set by member-state preferences, they also have opportunity to 
exploit the differences between these preferences in order to promote their own 
independent agendas. To make this argument more concrete, Cowles analyzes on the 
role of non-state ‘transnational’ actors by focusing on the inability of liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory to explore the roles of the key non-state actors in the 1992 
process. According to Cowles, the single market programme was not solely the product 
of conventional statecraft. Nor were Member States’ actions are estimated merely on the 
basis of domestic interest group interaction, as mentioned by a recent version of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Cowles asserts that “indeed, the story of the ERT [European 
Round Table of Industrialists] points to the fact that non-state actors-- and in particular, 
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multinational enterprises-- also play two-level games in EC policy-making” (1995:521-
2).   
 
 
 
 I.2.2.1. Multilevel Governance and “Discernible Multilevel Interaction Cycle” Analysis  
 
 
The evolution from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of the 1950s 
into the EU of today can be seen as a multi-faceted process. While the EU has 
sometimes witnessed history-making decisions taken by policy-makers, there were also 
day-to-day politics issues on the agenda. While on the one hand some issues were high 
politics issues, sometimes they were low-politics issues also. However, there was a time 
that the European integration process has changed its face without any possibility to 
return back to old days: the mid-1980s. After the Single European Act opened the single 
market, discussions on the distributional impacts of integration began again. This time 
the debate was clearly done in the language of relative wealth and poverty. With the 
effect of the single market aim, the EU policy process has turn the distributional policy-
making that is the allocation of resources to different groups, sectors, regions, and 
countries, whether intentionally or not. (Wallace 2000:31) For example, the policy 
makers began to utilize the term ‘cohesion’ (a commitment to interest in economic and 
social divergence, and the needs of the more backward regions and social groups). Also, 
the ‘structural funds’ as the main spending mechanism includes programmes and 
projects for, on the other hand, regional and local authorities. Therefore, this point in 
time has led to the opening of direct contacts between the European and the infra-
national levels of government, and the politics that developed around them that resulted 
in the term ‘multilevel governance’ to characterize this new policy mode (2000:31). 
 
 
 
I.2.2.2. Ongoing Trend: Governance 
 
 
In the last thirty years, the idea of the capacity of the state to control or direct 
society and the extent to which the institutions of central government retain monopoly 
on political power has become clearly discussed. The next step has been the question of 
‘What is government?’ According to Kooiman, ‘governing was basically regarded as 
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one-way traffic from those governing to those governed’(2000:142). Therefore 
‘governance’ should include the idea of some sort of switch from this one-way traffic to 
explain the transformation of the nature of the way of central governments do their jobs. 
Among the efforts to explain this transformation in the world politics, the EU studies 
had also its place due to the same trend that the policy makers began to implement. 
Governance by and within the Union is developing towards a model of political 
organization which cannot be adequately described anymore by the concept of the 
externally and internally sovereign state (Jachtenfuchs 1997:39). Endogenous and 
exogenous dynamics lead to a new kind of European political system: this is 
characterized by the fusion between instruments, procedures, and networks from several 
levels of public policies (Wessels 1992). This fusion was the clearly apparent 
phenomenon and unavoidably began to be accepted among the EU with the 
consciousness of the ‘drift of authority away from government, hence the term 
‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czemprei 1992). 
In fact, the term in general emerged from the inclination to the idea of ‘centreless 
society’ in today's more interaction based society. The main assertion related to the 
concept of governance is the recognition that there is not one but many centers of power 
which tie a whole variety of actors each other, be they at the local, regional, national, or 
supranational level (Richards and Smith 2002:14).  
However, the appearance of this sort of trend to accept the existence of multi-
actor based society has to include some reasons to explain why central governments 
come to the acceptance point of this situation, what are the challenges to their 
institutional strengths. Pierre (2000:1) claims that the ‘external’ factors such as the 
deregulation of financial markets and subsequently increased volatility of international 
capital that has left the state without much of its traditional capacity to govern the 
economy. Subnational governments have become more stubborn against the state; cities 
and regions-frequently with the effect of attempts related to the ethnic and cultural 
identification-are placing themselves in the international arena, searching for bypassing 
central state institutions and interests. (Le Gales 2002). On the other hand, new public 
management (NPM)-deregulation, contracting-out, agencification, privatization have 
been seen as ‘internal’ factors that created the unintended consequences of the 
appearance of quasi-autonomous relationships in order to mimic market style 
relationship has increased the level of fragmentation and created a complex bureaucratic 
topography (Bache and Flinders 2004:36). 
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The argument is that an outcome of all these changes has been decreasing the 
power of the central government or ,as it is seen in the European Union, ‘the gradual 
shift from a Weberian form of modern government towards the institutionalization of 
post-Weberian governance’( Wiener 1998:319). 
From these arguments, the discourses of rigid intergovernmentalists on state 
sovereignty and zero-sum game notions have left its place to the clear signs of the 
ongoing trend in world politics on the way to ‘governance’. This trend also points to the 
nature of the policy processes that contain a variety of actors playing different games in 
arenas on various times. According to Rhodes (1997:15), ‘Governance refers to self-
organizing, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource 
exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state’. This networks 
system leads to the decisions which are not produced by a ‘one-way traffic’, such as a 
democratically elected legislative assembly and government, but instead ‘arise from the 
interaction of a plethora of public and private, collective and individual actors’ 
(Christiansen and Piattoni 2003: 6).  
This character of ‘governance’ is very crucial because today’s policy making 
processes can not be understood by looking at the one screen, but can be realized by 
looking at an ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of 
public policy under the light of the argument of the ‘discernible multilevel interaction 
cycle’. In this focus on the term to multilevel interactions on decision making, it can be 
also asserted that governance is apart from what governments do. Here also systems of 
rules operate as the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms 
designed to insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance’ (Rosenau 
1992; 2000:171). 
Clearly, the increased participation of non-governmental actors in the EU game 
makes us to realize the increasingly ‘complex state-society relationship in which actors 
are prominent in policy-making and the state’s primary role is policy co-ordination 
rather that direct policy control’ (Bache and Flinders 2004:35). In these complex state-
society relationships, Brussels has become an ‘open city’ for all kinds of intermediary 
groups. For example, the number of officially declared interest groups has increased 
from around 200 (1960) to some 2,200 (1995); differentiated and fragmented forms of 
involvement led over the 1980s to approximately 10,000 lobbyists working in Brussels 
in 1990 (Andersen and Eliassen 1991; Commission 1992b; Kohler-Koch 1992); and 
 25 
meetings organized by the Commission assemble- again in a very rough approximation-
30,000 participants per year (Wessels and Rometsch 1996).  
To sum up, the ‘governance without government’ ideal can be seen as a kind of 
trend in the world politics, in particularly the EU. The state coordinates between the 
rules, roles, games away from the grasping the decision making power by accepting the 
challenges that it is exposed to in the changing world environment. 
 
 
 
I.2.2.3. ‘Multilevelness’ in the EU Policy Processes 
 
 
If the roles of the nation states are changing in the EU system, then the questions 
of who are the new players in the game and what are the institutional challenges to the 
gatekeeping capacity of national executives in the EU system wait for an answer. The 
reality of the EU’s growing competence in a wide range of policy domains above the 
nation state is standing there. In addition, the issue of activation of both the sub-regional 
and sub-local level in recent years in some policy domains is indisputable. Because, it 
becomes increasingly common for sub-national actors and supra-national actors to 
communicate directly without working through the national level while we are 
mentioning about the multilevel interactions of different actors in the EU policy making 
and implementation processes. Then, in order to explore the changing nature of EU, 
firstly the roles of the formal players of this system should be analyzed and then other 
actors should be placed inside the informal networks of interaction. 
As one of the most crucial institutions of the EU, the European Commission is 
seen as an effective bureaucracy of the Union, composed of officials organized into 
directorates-generals. In general terms, the Commission’s role is as an advisory body 
and executor on policy matters. Due to its broadness and huge capacity of expertise 
within the EU, the Commission has an extremely considerable affect on the whole range 
of decisions made within Europe. The Commission is the creator of most EU policy 
proposals, and, for many, the key agent in the whole of the decision-making process. 
In principle, the Council of Ministers and European Council are seen as the main 
decision-making bodies of the EU. The Council of Ministers, composed of ministers of 
European governments for key policy areas, decides on the one hand, related to EU 
policy in areas under first pillar through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), on the other 
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hand through unanimity in the second and third pillar issues. However, due to these 
councils relatively infrequent meetings, the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) makes the majority of decisions via the national officials there. Moreover, 
the Council mostly comes to ‘common positions’, which have frequently to be 
reconciled with amendments to legislation proposed by MEPs in a ‘conciliation 
procedure’ with the emergence of joint decision-making procedure (Wallace 2000a:19). 
Additionally, the European Council, a summit meeting of the leaders of the EU Member 
States, generally makes decisions affecting the overall direction and future of the EU. 
Another actor in the EU system, the European Parliament (EP), while a 
consultative body in decision making process, has now extended its role to one where in 
a wide variety of areas it is involved in joint decision-making with the Council of 
Ministers. With each of the treaty reforms, the EP has gained new powers and turned 
into ‘a force to be reckoned with’ (Wallace 2000a:21).   
Finally, the other crucial institution of the EU is the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), a critical player for the EU legislation by interpreting and ruling on EU 
legislation. The most crucial motivating factor of the role of ECJ in the EU is that the 
ECJ has been setting up the supremacy of EU law over national law, and thus has a 
significant influence on the process of implementation of the EU policies.  
While these institutions portray the formal institutional structure of the arena that 
the actors are playing their roles on the way of decision making and implementation 
processes, apart from this, other actors behind the scenes help us to explore the real 
nature of the ‘European Union game’. They are of all kinds interest groups and sub-
governmental actors. The Single European Act had opened the way for the increasing 
influence of these interest groups, and they began to mobilize in the arena of the 
Community policy issues by reaching Brussels directly (Marks and McAdam 1996). 
Due to the fact that agenda setting is a crucial issue in the EU, most of the European 
institutions have inevitable demands over this agenda. Although the Commission has 
the major role in initiation process, it has to take into account of all other stakeholders’ 
needs to combine the demands.  Therefore, the Commission has to be responsive to 
these formal and informal actors of the system. 
To sum up, the EU is a non-hierarchical negotiation system in which decisions are 
to be shaped by extensive consultation, combining the demands of private and public 
actors even before draft proposals are presented, and yet more discussions across the 
policy making organs of the Union, and between Europe-level actors and member state 
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representatives in the actual decision-making process. The effects of informal network 
of influence in the EU system have not ended with decision making process. This 
influence is also seen also at the implementation of policies. According to the 
Commission report, some 3,000 interest groups and lobbies employing about 10,000 
people were based in Brussels in 1992. Among these are the 500 ‘Euro-groups’ which 
aggregate interests at the European level (McLaughlin and Greenwood 1995) and some 
150 offices in Brussels, representing regional and local authorities (Hooghe and Marks 
2001:15). Fourth chapter’s case study relates to the emergence and development of 
biodiversity policy issue in the UK. The entirety of interest groups have inevitable 
effects not only on decision making processes, but also on continuing watch the process 
of implementation to guarantee the outcomes reached within domestic policy processes 
involving actors not just at the national level, but also the regional and local level as 
well as participation (or at least compliance) from the private sector. 
 
 
 
I.2.2.4. Result: ‘European Union Multilevel Interactions Game’-‘Multilevel Governance 
is more than an Approach, an Established Philosophy’ 
 
 
This game is represents something more of the European integration process that 
the all theories, approaches, explanations, and concepts mention. As a deductive point 
of view or looking at the EU game from the ‘outside’, it seems some sort of an 
accumulation of procedures, systems, rules, actors, and so on. It is a kind of arena where 
different interests are driven. However, in its essence, the EU is, in simplest terms, a 
picture of an image of ‘multilevel interactions cycle’. This study does not aim to 
identify the most important players in decision making and implementation, which 
processes are shaped in which ways, or what kind of dynamics leads the EU’s 
continuation. Our effort is to display the ongoing nature of the EU by focusing on the 
‘governance’ phenomenon with its multilevel framework of interaction. As was 
mentioned earlier, the multilevel governance strongly inspires to reach this aim. 
However, our effort is not to create new kind of approach or theory, but to display the 
EU’s pluralist philosophy.  
In this context, characterizing the EU as just a different state form is extremely 
difficult. The reality is that the EU does not replace the nation state, but creates suitable 
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environment for the development of new forms of political conflict, dependence, and 
interdependence. States need the EU to provide markets, political security, and 
transnational response to international and global problems (Richards and Smith 
2002:163). The EU can therefore be seen as some sort of inter-feeding system of states 
of the Europe where Member States exist with each other and because of each other. 
That is to say, this conscious formation of Member States exists to demand regulations 
that affect all spheres of life of all Member States. Thus, the Member States, 
consciously, permitted to increase ‘the scope and depth of policy making at the EU-
level. For example, the EU has almost completed the internal market and has absorbed 
the institutional reforms of the Single European Act (1986), which established QMV in 
the Council of Ministers, and increased the power of the EP. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) further expanded EU competencies and the scope of QMV in the Council, 
provided the EP with a veto on certain types of legislation’ (Marks et al. 1996: 343). 
Step-by-step, the Member States are aligned with the Community with their own 
willingness under the influence of ‘governance’ trend and multilevel stakeholders. For 
example, the difficulty of the controlling the Commission, the problems with agreeing 
to restrain the process of integration, the unique informational base of the Commission, 
the regulatory powers of the Commission and the European Court of Justice, and the 
unintended consequences of institutional change all make it difficult for national 
governments to control the EU (Richards and Smith 2002:151). From this argument, it 
is understood that central governments began to be away from the ‘gatekeeping role’ on 
the EU levels of policy making: and, secondly, that engagement at the European level 
resulted in an opportunity to strengthen a phenomenon of regionalization. As Wallace 
mentioned, one way of understanding the policy process of the EU is as the junction-
box that is as a concentrated point of intersection, interaction, and filtering, between 
country-based institutions and processes, and the wider international context (2000:32). 
Social science theories generally do not satisfy everyone. Whatever phenomena 
they try to explain and whatever forms they take, they are almost invariably are 
criticized for being deficient in many aspects. Commonly identified deficiencies include 
focusing on only part of the phenomena under examination, being too general in scope 
and/or formulation, excessively time-bound, and insufficiently empirically grounded 
(Nugent 2003: 486). However, multilevel governance can have a suitable framework 
and inspiration to show us the entirety of the picture: the ‘discernable multilevel 
interactions cycle’. 
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As applied to the EU, this kind of ‘governance perspective ‘is that character of 
politics and government at the European and national levels turned into a system of 
multilevel, non-hierarchical, deliberative and apolitical governance, via a complex web 
of public/private networks and quasi-autonomous executive agencies (Hix, 1998:54). In 
addition, rather than thinking about the extent to which Europe has become ‘integrated’, 
it is helpful to explore, as the multilevel governance approach examines, how the centre 
of authority have shifted over the past half-century in the EU. 
In order to understand the philosophy behind the multilevel governance approach, 
we should examine the main arguments of it. According to the creators of the approach, 
the multilevel governance version of the EU is a ’set of overarching, multilevel policy 
networks [where]…the structure of political control is variable, not constant across 
policy space’ (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996:41).  
Following the scheme advanced by Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996), three main 
characteristics that shape the heart of the multilevel governance model of the EU can be 
mentioned. One is that decision-making competences are exercised by, not only national 
governments but also institutions and actors at other levels. The most important of these 
levels is the EU level, where supranational actors-of which the most important are the 
Commission, the EP, and the ECJ-, are identified as exercising an independent influence 
on policy processes and policy outcomes. In many Member States, subnational levels 
are also seen as important, with regional and local authorities able to engage in policy 
activities that are not (wholly) controllable by national governments. Although 
multilevel governance has such a hierarchical multilevel policy processes, our 
perspective has no such kind of hierarchy due to fact that there can be power-
assymetries between the stakeholders. Moreover, our aim is to show the discernable and 
extremely clear interaction in the EU policy processes between all tiers of influence 
rather than proving which institutions are most powerful than others. 
Secondly, collective decision-making by states at the EU level is thought as 
involving a significant loss of national sovereignty, and therefore a significant loss of 
control by national governments. The intergovernmental view that states retain the 
ultimate decision-making power is rejected, largely on the grounds that ‘lowest 
common denominator outcomes are available only on a subset of EU decisions, mainly 
those concerning the scope of integration’ (Marks et al., 1996:346).  
It is important to pay attention, not simply to the process through which major 
institutional change takes place in the EU, but also to the ‘day-to-day’ functioning of the 
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EU as a polity (Cram 1996:53) . As Peterson also mentions no single theory can explain 
EU governance at all levels of analysis. Broad ‘macro’ approaches to the issue of 
integration are particularly useful for explaining the major ‘history-making’ decisions of 
the EU. When it comes to explaining ‘policy setting’ or ‘policy shaping’ decisions, 
‘macro-theories tend to loose their explanatory power’ (Peterson 1995:84). 
Thirdly, political arenas are viewed as interconnected rather than nested. So, 
rather than national political activity being limited to the national arena and national 
inputs into EU decision-making being channeled via state-level actors, a variety of 
channels and interconnections between different level of government –supranational, 
national, subnational- are seen as both existing and important. Therefore, states are seen 
an integral and powerful part of the EU and although some says, “the decision-making 
process evolving in the Community gives a key role to governments—national 
government at the moment, and . . . subnational government increasingly in selected 
arenas” (Sbragia 1992:289). According to multilevel governance, states no longer 
provide the sole interface between supranational and subnational arenas, and they share, 
rather than monopolize, control over many activities that take place in their respective 
territories (Marks et al. 1996:347). 
At this point, the argument of decreasing the control power of central 
governments over many issue areas in the EU refers to some crucial institutional 
changes in the EU as well as its formal interactions. While Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 
agree on the central role of the Council of Ministers in the EU decision-making, they 
also mention a number of constraints on the ability of individual governments to control 
the outcomes of such collective decision-making. The use of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in the Council was an obvious constraint: any individual government might be 
outvoted. The Luxembourg Compromise did allow a government to exercise a veto if it 
felt that its vital national interests were threatened, but the prevailing culture in the 
Council worked against frequent use of this option, making it a rather blunt instrument 
for maintaining national sovereignty. So, while it was true that governments might be 
able to attain desired objectives by pooling their sovereignty that was not the same as 
arguing that their control of the process remained intact. Therefore, the ‘gatekeeper’ role 
of national executives is increasingly challenged via these institutional changes 
(Hooghe 1996; Bache 1999; Bache and Bristow 2003). So in summary, the institutional 
check and balance system does not permit one formal institutional actor of the EU to 
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play the game itself with the pressure coming from the necessity to interact, consult, 
negotiate on policy process.  
Another reason why advocates of multilevel governance believed governments 
had difficulty in controlling supranational institutions was because the state itself was 
not a unified actor. This is the second reason why we see the EU as a picture of 
‘discernable multilevel interaction cycle’. Moravscik had accepted this in his liberal 
intergovernmentalist position so far as defining the national interest was concerned. He 
saw a domestic pluralist process taking place. Marks, Hooghe and Blank move further 
and assert that sections of the government and non-state actors would form alliances 
with their counterparts in other Member States, which might influence national 
governments’ negotiating positions on EU matters. These alliances would not be under 
control of the core institutions of the national government, such as the Foreign Office or 
the Prime Minister’s Office.  
For example, local and regional governments have opened independent offices in 
Brussels; subnational governments, across the EU and beyond, have formed a formal 
and informal networks; in regions designated for cohesion funding by the EU 
subnational officials assist design and implement economic development plans near 
national and Commission officials; and subnational governments are represented in 
highly visible, though stick primarily symbolic, assemblies-most notably, the new 
Committee of the Regions founded with the Maastricht Treaty (Hooghe and Marks 
1996:73). 
In order to concretize these examples and demonstrate how really the broad EU 
system based on the multilevel interactions cycle functions, some principal channels of 
subnational representation can be mentioned. These are the Committee of Regions, the 
Council of Ministers, the Commission, regional offices, and transnational associations. 
(ibid: 74) 
As it is written under article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty, a member state can be 
represented by regional ministers with full negotiating powers in the Council of 
Ministers.4 Therefore, subnational authorities began to exploit different ways to engage 
in European decision making for. In this direction, most Member States have begun to 
take territorially diverse interests into account. In the UK delegation in Brussels, Welsh 
                                                
4
 Article 146 reads; “The Council shall consist of a representative of each member state 
at ministerial level, authorized to commit the government of that member state.” 
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and Scottish administrations are represented indirectly through appointment in 
functional areas of special concern to them (ibid: 77). 
In addition, regarding another channel for the representation of subnational 
authorities, the 1988 reform of the structural funds stipulates that the Commission, 
national authorities, regional or local committees and social actors should work in close, 
equal, and ongoing ‘partnership’.5 For example, in the UK, structural programming has 
enhanced expectations among subnational actors concerning their role in regional 
development and has precipitated a variety of new subnational partnerships (ibid: 82). 
That is to say, the partnership comes to the core philosophy in the EU beyond the 
wordings of reform programmes or agreements. This again gives us clues for the overall 
picture of the interaction system that the EU has been established.  
Consistently, as mentioned earlier, in recent years, subnational governments have 
opened independent offices in Brussels which lobby, gather information, and network 
with other regional actors and with EU political actors. For example, in the UK, where 
subnational government is relatively weak, local authorities, regional quangos, regional 
enterprise organizations, national local authority organizations and even universities 
fund 17 offices representing an individual city, individual local authorities, regional 
groupings of local authorities, and a national local authority organizations, alongside 
offices representing the North of England, North Ireland, Scotland and Welsh (ibid: 83). 
Regarding transnational associations, an important factor influencing the 
effectiveness of such associations as lobbyists is their capacity to recruit widely. The 
European Commission is eager to exchange information and collaborate with regional 
associations, but has been reluctant to deal with those that are narrowly based (ibid: 88) 
 
 
 
I.3.Conclusions 
 
 
 
After all these arguments on multilevel governance approach, the argument that 
multilevel governance raised new and important questions about the role, power, and 
                                                
5
 The original wording in the regulations spoke of “component authorities designated by 
the member states at national, regional, local or other level” as the third partner, but it 
was obvious that regional and local authorities were targeted. The formulation was 
strengthened in favor of regional and local authorities in the 1993 regulations. 
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authority of nation-states (Bache 2005:5) can not be ignored to see the complete picture 
of the EU from this study’s point of view. It is true that, the White Paper on European 
Governance ( COM (2001) 428 final)  has also sought to address wider issues of 
reforming decision-making procedures in the EU, in particular with a view to 
addressing the issue of democratic accountability of European governance. Moreover, 
links between EU policy-makers and interest groups here became part of a wider agenda 
of structuring the access of ‘civil society’ to the decision-making centre in Brussels. 
(Christiansen and Piattoni 2003:4). However, beyond these legal based instruments that 
strengthen the ideal of ‘governance’ in the EU, the more important issue is that 
understanding how the EU game should be seen as a ‘discernable multilevel interactions 
cycle’ in which all the actors and the levels of policy processes are connected to each 
other is a sort of negotiation. Although the decisions can be taken by formal institutions, 
some governments are more powerful than others, and there are some rules and 
regulations in the system. More than the reasons and results, there is a kind of checks 
and balances in a cycle that is affecting each other continuously.  
In addition, this system is shaped by the Member States with their own 
consciousness. All of them know the consequences of being a member of the EU such 
as transferring some of their own decision making competences to political institutions 
with the aim of joint exercise of sovereignty in the EU, i.e. governing agents, have lost 
their exclusive privilege of authoritative allocation (Kohler-Koch and Knodt 1997: 3f.). 
Therefore, the consequence is seen in fact as a policy making process characterized by- 
amongst other things- conflicts of a distributional nature, resource dependencies and 
various ‘nested games’ (Rosamond 2000:106). 
It should also be noted that the EU political game is not simply about matters of 
high politics such as the pooling or retention of national currencies or the development 
of a common European foreign policy& defense identity. Much (perhaps most) of what 
goes on in the EU game is about day-to-day technical, regulatory policy-making 
(ibid:107). As Richardson puts it (1996b:5): “Low politics this may be…but it is 
probably the nine tenths of the EU ‘policy iceberg’ that is below the water line. There is 
an increasing amount of political activity at this level within the EU and some means 
has to be found of analyzing and conceptualizing it.” Therefore, under the light of these 
arguments, the following part of the study will mention EU biodiversity policy as an 
example of the unseen iceberg but in fact a crucial part of the EU multilevel interaction 
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cycle. Today’s EU politics differs from the Gaullist modes of decision-making in the 
1960s (Wallace, 1996b).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
EU BIODIVERSITY POLICY 
 
 
 
II.1. The Emergence of the Biodiversity Policy 
 
 
 
All organisms live with each other in some sort of harmony in nature. In this 
situation, the balance of environment and the continuity of the planet are ensured. 
However, the involvement of human beings into this equilibrium is creating a kind of 
irreversible damage. At this point, studying biodiversity is becoming so critical for the 
sake of all living organisms. 
It is true that, biodiversity conservation does not attract too much attention for 
social scientists. This is may be related, at least to some degree, to the idea that studying 
biodiversity needs also study on some technical matters, engaging in some calculations 
such as the determining the under-danger ecological or site specific organisms and 
observing them in some periods, or finding scientific reasons for the dangers in 
analytical manners and so on. 
By taking into account this kind of expertise needed to reach all the details for the 
policy under consideration, in this chapter, the appearance of this policy in the EU and 
main components of the policy and the general functioning of the biodiversity policy in 
the EU with all its participants will be analyzed. 
 
 
 
II.1.1. Brief History of EU Biodiversity Policy 
 
 
Nearly 50 years before, environment was not in the policy concerns mentioned in 
the founding treaties of the EU. There were some provisions in these treaties related to 
human health and safety; however, they were not completely shaping environmental 
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policy. As time passed, however, the environmental consciousness has spread out all 
EU with the increasing greening environment in Europe. The 1987 Single European Act 
(SEA)6 has formed some sort of junction point for EU Environmental Policy, and, after 
this time, this policy arena gained formal recognition as part of the Community’s legal 
framework. Therefore, as one of the most dynamic, all-encompassing and effective 
areas of competence, environmental policy is today seen one of the most important parts 
of EU law. Especially after the Cardiff Summit in June 1998, environmental policy 
became most fundamental and extended areas of the EU’s policies with renewed goals 
for environmental policy integration.  
In line with the reality of growing significance of environmental policy in the EU, 
another important point is that the biodiversity conservation issue has begun more 
politicized than the in past due to the increasing economic significance of biodiversity 
resources that has created specifically economic benefits for member states and the EU 
in general. With these concerns, research by the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
has demonstrated [that], against this kind of political attention, there is clearly seen 
biodiversity loss that the EU started to press the Commission for more effective action 
(EEA, 1995a; EEA, 1999). 
In addition, sectoral problems emerging out from interactions of different sectors 
such as agriculture, transport, regional policy, are creating many problems for 
biodiversity. Because of this reason, biodiversity policy has been tied to the sectoral 
policy integration attempts that gained attention after 1998, the Cardiff meeting. Not 
only are these threats to biodiversity at European level, but also some global problems  
such as climate change issue, greenhouse gas emissions etc are affecting the 
biodiversity and all ecosystems in the EU. Therefore, both the issue of biodiversity’s 
increasing politicization and the growing importance of international obligations for the 
Community7 make the study of EU biodiversity policy more significant than before.  
 
 
                                                
6
 For further information  see, Single European Act (SEA), OJ L 169 of 29.06.1987 
from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/treaties_other.htm 
 
7
 “With over one-third of current Union environmental policy originating from 
obligations arising out of international agreements, this influence is part of a wider 
trend”. For further information see Susan Baker, ‘The Dynamics of European Union 
Biodiversity Policy: Interactive Functional and Institutional Logics’. Environmental 
Politics 12 (3):25, 2003 
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II.1.2. Progress in the Biodiversity Policy Area 
 
 
Then, the question of which steps that the EU has taken for the problems related 
to biodiversity comes to mind. In this direction, the first step can be seen as with the 
Wild Birds Directive, that will be analyzed in detail in the following parts, in the 1970’s 
in Community biodiversity and nature protection legislation. The aim of this directive is 
the protection of all of wild birds in Europe. Therefore, it identifies 194 endangered 
species and sub-species and forms special conservation measures for them.  
Another measure is taken with the 1992 Habitats Directive that aims to enlarge 
the area of species under threat covering approximately 450 animals and 500 plants. 
This Directive also has the goal of shaping the network of Natura 2000 including sites 
of highest nature value. This network offers protection in the selected areas and asserts 
that member states have to arrange protection measures to ensure the conservation of 
biodiversity at these sites.  
Biodiversity Strategy, in 1998, brings new motivation for the member states 
including Biodiversity Action Plans that were adopted under this strategy in 2001 with 
the aim of protection and conservation of natural resources, agriculture, fisheries, 
economic and development in line with general biodiversity conservation aims. In 
addition these two directives, the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme 
2001-12 also direct its attention to biodiversity and nature as one of the EU priorities.  
 In consistency with these steps taken by the Community, in 2001, the European 
Council reached an agreement to halt biodiversity loss in the EU by 2010 and to 
conserve the stability of habitats and natural systems. In 2002, this aim extended to 
global scale and 130 world leaders including the EU, agreed on to extremely decrease 
the loss of biodiversity globally before 2010. 
Moreover, the EU not only takes legal measure on European level, but also its 
aims from global obligations as well. Regarding this, the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), signed in 1992, called for so many measures, including the integration 
of biodiversity conservation into sectoral and cross-sectoral policies and the 
development of national strategies (Article 6); the establishment of monitoring 
mechanisms (Article 7); in-situ conservation (Article 8); and the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity resources (Article 11) (EEA 1997: 9–11). As part of this 
Convention (ratified in 1993), the EU began to push the member states to take measures 
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related to biodiversity and effectively implementing them. In fact, EU Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plans have come into being with the effect of this Convention. The 
member states began to form Action plans combining CBD obligations and EU 
Directives in a complementary way, as it will be witnessed in the following parts. 
In fact, the EU tries to combine obligations coming from international agreements 
signed on biodiversity issue with its own rules and regulations. Moreover, it also 
promotes some sort of synergy between them. Some examples of these international 
conventions and agreements include the Convention on Migratory Species (Bonn 
Convention), the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Habitats 
(Berne Convention), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CIRES). Moreover, there are also some other significant regional conventions related 
to some other issues in environmental policy and have implications on biodiversity such 
as related to marine environment: OSPAR, HELCOM, Barcelona Convention.  
 
 
 
II.1.3. Integrating biodiversity concerns into EU law 
 
 
While all these measures taken for the improvement of biodiversity priorities are 
in the EU in line with EU’s own directives, rules, and obligations and with international 
ones, there is also one more question waiting for answer: how biodiversity concerns 
have been effectively integrated into EU law and policy. 
At the EU level, biodiversity priorities under the aim of halting the loss of 
biodiversity before 2010 are aligned with the EU Sustainable Development Strategy and 
the Lisbon Strategy in a comprehensive environmental and sectoral policy framework. 
Moreover, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms aims to decrease the negative 
effects of intensification and of abandonment of high-nature-value farmland and forests 
by taking into account EU Biodiversity policy priorities. For example, the IRENA 
project (2002) aimed to set 35 indicators, including agriculture and environment 
priorities, at the same time and reached this aim. These indicators are shaped to change 
data on interaction between people working on agriculture and state of the environment 
in order to support decisions taken for better policy making. 
Regarding Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), a significant amount of development 
has been achieved to integrate its policies with the aims of biodiversity protection. With 
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the reform made in 2002, multi-annual improvement plans take the place of short-term 
decision making style. Therefore, this new way of development in fisheries policy has 
aimed to encourage more environment-friendly fishing methods by fixing the ratio of 
the fishing fleets according to fish stocks. 
In addition, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive aimed to find 
potential influences of major regional and territorial transformations such as focusing on 
alternatives and new measures to impede and decrease negative effects. At this 
assessment process, early-interference becomes so critical for the decision-making 
process. Regarding biodiversity policy, these assessments are also so preventive and 
valuable for the pre-screening of the sites before shaping decisions or taking measures. 
 
 
 
II.1.4. New Legal Instruments for biodiversity conservation 
 
 
One of these instruments is the Environmental Liability Directive that brings 
‘polluter pays’ principle to EU’s environmental policy agenda by paying attention to the 
damage occurs protected sites under the 1992 Habitats and 1979 Bird Directives. 
Another one is the Water Framework Directive that shapes the framework for 
conservation of water resources to decrease pollution, encouraging sustainable use of 
water, conserving the aqua habitat, and observing ecosystems under water, and so on. In 
addition, the Arhus Convention can be seen as one of the most significant instruments 
amongst others due to its stress on the importance of accessibility to environmental 
information and the necessity of public participation to environmental decision-making 
and implementation processes and availability of access to justice regarding 
environmental issues.  
Finally, the seven environmental thematic strategies still in use in the Community 
has seven priority areas such as marine environment, soil, sustainable use of pesticides, 
air pollution, urban environment, the sustainable use and management of natural 
resources, as well as waste prevention and recycling. In all these areas of policy, the 
Commission tries to bring long-term ecosystem consciousness. 
 
 
 
II.2. Current Process and Dynamics of EU Biodiversity Policy 
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II.2.1. Biodiversity Concern in the 5th and 6th Environmental Action Plans 
 
 
As touched upon before, the first phase of EU biodiversity policy encountered 
with the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (Fifth EAP), Towards Sustainability 
(CEC, 1992). It mainly interested in protection, conservation, and use of biodiversity as 
part of a wider environmental strategy with the goal of the promotion of sustainable 
development. The general target of biodiversity policy was to guarantee ‘no further 
deterioration of ecosystems and habitats necessary to maintain diversity of species and 
within species’ (CEC, 1998a: 5). 8 
In addition, the five policy aims of the Action Plan regarding biodiversity 
conservation can be summarized as firstly, maintenance or restoration of natural 
habitats and species of wild fauna and flora at a favorable conservation status; second, 
promotion of sustainable land management practices in and around habitats of 
importance; third, creation of the Natura 2000 European network of protected sites; 
fourth, maintenance of strict control over the abuse of, and trade in, wild species; and 
finally, protection of forests (CEC, 1992: 48). 
After the 5th EAP, the following Action Plan (Sixth EAP), adopted under the co-
decision procedure by Council and Parliament in 2002, as the EU's ten-years (2002-
2012) policy programme, encounters the second phase of  the establishment of EU 
biodiversity policy by making the biodiversity issue as one of four priority areas for 
EU-level action over the next ten years (CEC, 2001b). The time that this environmental 
action plan emerged is the term that decisions, monitoring and implementation 
processes began to flourish and became more concrete. From this time on, the 
biodiversity issue started to attract more attention in the EU. In addition, the Sixth EAP 
aims to integrate environmental concerns into different policy sectors, such as in 
response to Agenda 2000. The Community’s biodiversity considerations in 
environmental policy framework turn to the potential impacts of Eastern enlargement 
regarding CAP (CEC, 2000). Many projects and plans of Agenda 2000, such as 
infrastructure development, agricultural modernization, and industrial restructuring 
                                                
8
 For further information see Susan Baker, ‘The Dynamics of European Union 
Biodiversity Policy: Interactive, Functional, and Institutional logics’, Environmental 
Politics, 12(3):23-41, 2003 
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influence biodiversity. With these aims, the Environment for Europe Process is creating 
a Work Programme on biological and landscape diversity in forest ecosystems in East 
and Central Europe (CEC, 1998a: 68–70). Moreover, there are also environmental 
objectives in the TACIS and the Phare programmes, the latter particularly targeted at in 
situ protection and the implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directives in Candidate 
Countries (Baker 2003: 33). 
In addition, the 6th EAP aiming environmental objectives between the terms of 
2002-2012, issued main areas of action that the Community and so member states 
should take measures to achieve. These areas of action were climate change, nature and 
biodiversity, environment and health, and finally sustainable use of natural resources 
and waste management.  
Regarding nature and biodiversity, 6th EAP aims to prevent the dangers to the 
existence of species and their habitats and in this direction suggests to complete the 
Natura 2000 network, shape new biodiversity action plans related to different sectors, 
more care to protect landscapes, attention to the conservation of aquatic ecosystems, 
implement new action plans to avert the effects of industrial accidents and form new 
strategies for soil protection. In consistency with these targets that the 6th EAP aims to 
reach, the use of natural resources in sustainable manners and waste management also 
become such significant areas of the EU related to the biodiversity. In these areas of 
policy, recycling is encouraged and waste management was seen priority for the 
prevention of biodiversity and nature. 
When the difference between two EAPs is examined, the clearest similarity 
between their approaches is their environmental plans and coerciveness. In contrast to 
previous EAPs, the 6th EAP does not include quantifiable goals and deadlines. This can 
be the result of failure of the previous ones that although these calculations and 
timetables existed, results were unsuccessful. Therefore, the 6th EAP offered seven 
thematic strategies with three year assessment periods.  
 
 
 
II.2.2. Biodiversity Strategy and Biodiversity Action Plans 
 
 
As mentioned before, the EU Biodiversity Strategy, the core of the Biodiversity 
policy, was formed in February 1998 by the Commission to resist the existing and 
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possible threats to the biodiversity and therefore all organisms in the nature. The overall 
purpose can be seen as “to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant 
reduction or loss of biodiversity at the source. This purpose should help both to reverse 
present trends in biodiversity reduction or losses and to place species and ecosystems, 
which includes agro-ecosystems, at a satisfactory conservation status, both within and 
beyond the territory of the Union” (COM(2001) 162 final). In addition, it aims to 
continue the use of old initiatives, and with the Council warning, it also begins to use of 
existing legal and financial instruments9. The main difference point this approach and 
the previous is the aim to bring together these initiatives into more consistent strategic 
policy framework. (Baker 2003: 32). 
The Community Biodiversity Strategy offers a decisive framework for action, by 
forming four major themes10 and determining sectoral and horizontal targets. In 
consistency with these, the Biodiversity Strategy intends particularly to combine 
biodiversity considerations with related sectoral policies, especially with sustainable use 
of natural resources and their protection, agriculture, fisheries, regional policies and 
spatial planning, forests, energy and transport, tourism, development and economic co-
operation. 
After the adoption of this Strategy, the Commission implemented its most 
significant priority coming from the CBD obligations.11 The following step from the 
Strategy can be seen as the formation and implementation of Biodiversity Action Plans 
and of other measures influencing the policy areas concerned. These sectoral plans 
                                                
9
 For further information see Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions,15-16 
June 1998,  from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/54315.pdf,  
20 November, 2006) 
 
10
 “The Strategy builds around four themes: (1) Conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity; (2) Sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources; (3) Research, identification, monitoring and exchange of information; (4) 
Education, training and awareness” for further information see Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Biodiversity Action Plans in 
the areas of Conservation of Natural Resources, Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Development and Economic Co-operation’ , COM(2001) 162 final 
 
11
 Council Decision of 25 October 1993 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. OJ L 309 ; 13.12.93 
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determine precise and concrete initiatives and actions to reach the purposes mentioned 
by the strategy. 
Moreover, “Biodiversity Action Plans in the areas of Conservation of Natural 
Resources, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Development and Economic Cooperation”( COM 
(2001)162final) set outs the way to determine appropriate indicators for monitoring and 
evaluating performance in the implementation of actions and measures envisaged and 
their effectiveness. 
 The development of the Action Plans belongs to the Commission services 
working in different policy areas and as the Biodiversity Strategy mentions the 
Commission services should work in co-operation with each other, those overseeing 
biodiversity policy, and the European Environment Agency and Member State experts. 
As seen, the Biodiversity Strategy envisages multi-party interaction for the development 
and implementation of Action Plans; in this direction, all the stakeholders in charge 
with this issue work in collaboration. In addition, Aarhus Convention12 steers the NGOs 
and other participants towards working in cooperation and coordination in the drafting 
process from its very early stages. 
In addition, the structure of these sectoral Action Plans are not same in all policy 
sectors but some sort of framework for each sector seems to be based on specific 
instruments and procedures which apply to these sectoral policies. Moreover, these 
action plans overlap due to the fact that all policy sectors have implications on each 
other. At this point, multi actor and multi dimensional co-operation and coordination 
become inevitable for the success to reach biodiversity targets. 
In broader policy context, as examined before, Biodiversity Strategy and its 
Action plans must be thought inside the realm of EU commitment to reach its 
sustainable development targets and aim of integrating environmental considerations 
into other sectors and policy areas in relation with articles 2, 3 and 6 of the EC Treaty. 
In addition, Biodiversity Action Plans must also be seen as the part of furthering 
Agenda 2000 initiative. 
                                                
12
 For further information see, Aarhus Convention, UN/ECE Convention on Access to 
Information,  Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters,  from http://www.unece.org/env/pp/, 5 September, 2006 
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  II.2.2.1. Implementation of Biodiversity Action Plans (BAPs)- Importance of   
indicators and monitoring 
 
 
As mentioned, the drafting process of BAPs includes many stakeholders relevant 
to different policy sectors. On the implementation stage, the situation does not change 
because these stakeholders appear also as the implementators of these policies, rules, 
and plans. Moreover, the implementation of the BAPs must point to some crosscutting 
issues in order to realize the influences on the ground. These include some sort of 
methods to connect monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plans and 
evaluating their development by identifying a set of indicators to estimate their 
performance. At this stage, combining all relevant information, making it as a basis for 
reporting and then preparing all these reachable to the public scrutiny becomes so 
significant for the future of the Action Plans. In the end, the implementation stage 
necessitates the research activities and these are provided through related Community 
programmes. 
The significance of indicators can not be denied due to the fact that ex and post 
implementation processes give clear results for the health of plans. With this aim, the 
Commission establishes concrete co-operation and co-ordination channels to assess 
before and after processes by intensifying indicators. The Biodiversity Strategy 
mentions that, “each Action Plan should as a general rule set out clear tasks, targets and 
mechanisms to assess their performance and to evaluate progress in the implementation 
of the strategy”. In addition, indicators are also crucial because they shape the basis for 
the implementators to establish connection between which species and ecosystems are 
affected by which policy sectors.  
According to Commission Communication adopted in 2001(COM 
(2001)162final), there is a two-level approach to determine on indicators that evaluate 
the performance of Biodiversity Strategy and BAPs. One is the indicators for particular 
policy instruments and initiatives. These need to be determined to connect the trends in 
the status of species and ecosystems with specific Community actions and their 
implementation at Member State level. Second are headline indicators that need to be 
used to evaluate the entire performance and influence of the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy 
and its Action Plans. 
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At the implementation stage, as it was stressed upon before, three-COs are so 
important between relevant policy areas. These are connection, co-operation and, co-
ordination. Biodiversity Strategy in general and BAPs in particular need so close three-
COs between all relevant Commission services and other stakeholders. Especially, an 
‘inter-service group’ provides the links for these interactions regarding Biodiversity 
issue. Moreover, many Community funds under special programmes are used in the 
service of these Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans. And as the final stage, the 
performance and success of the implementation processes depend especially to the 
measures that are taken by the member states. That’s why the alignment between the 
Community Strategies and Member states’ measures shapes the most significant part of 
the comprehensive success of the policy in general.  
In connection with this general purpose for the achievement of the Biodiversity 
Strategy and BAPs, the Commission suggests the formation of a Biodiversity Expert 
Committee with an order to distribute information and ensure the communication of 
steps taken by the EU and member states. Moreover, although their role is not more 
than being an observer, all other stakeholders such as NGOs, industry and other interest 
associations and civil society are encouraged to take their seat in the in meetings of this 
Committee (COM (2001)162final) . This can also be seen as the sign of Community’s 
point of view to the biodiversity policy by seeing all the supporting activities as a part 
of the general multi-level picture.  
This multi-level activity scheme does not end with these kinds of plans, aims, 
committees etc. Regarding the necessity for information based on indicators and 
monitoring, the EEA points out the significance of shaping a consistent and 
collaborative European biodiversity monitoring mechanism to provide information 
relevant to the 2010 target and the evaluation of progress after using these 
mechanisms.13 According to the Agency, four ‘lines of action’ should be carried out. 
The first one is the coordination of existing international monitoring mechanisms by 
shaping some sort of network. EEA and ECNC plays such a critical role at this issue, 
and they coordinate the European biodiversity monitoring and indicator framework 
(EBMI-F) established with the ‘Environment for Europe’ process of Council. These 
Agencies establish some sort of platform to achieve European co-operation on 
                                                
13
 For further information please see European Environmental Agency (EEA) Briefing, 
‘Halting the Loss of Biodiversity in Europe’, No 1/2004,  from 
http://reports.eea.europa.eu/briefing_2004_1/en/EEA_Briefing_BDIV_EN.pdf 
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biodiversity monitoring programme. They stress the need for long-term establishment of 
information networks on monitoring mechanisms by providing data flows and 
methodologies at the international level, and so increase the collaboration between 
different regional and national monitoring practices. 
Secondly, not only international collaboration is crucial but also European level 
interaction regarding data flow result from indicators and monitoring plays important 
role for the success on biodiversity policy. As the EEA indicates, today still not so much 
attention is paid to reporting on the processes of implementation in member states. 
Although the necessary reporting is not completely done, member states just trying to 
fulfill their obligations coming from Community directives such as Birds and Habitats 
Directives, or from international conventions they are tied to like CBD. In order to see 
the degree of success related to the 2010 targets (‘Halting the loss of Biodiversity before 
2010’) and trends in biodiversity conservation policy related to the relevant pressures 
and human activities, EEA mentions the necessity of a wide range of data and 
information that should be taken from member states.  
Thirdly, the coordination of national monitoring mechanisms is also crucial to 
realize the progress that the member states are achieving. With this aim in mind, the 
EEA brings together its member states, other participating states and interested 
international stakeholders by co-operating with them under the European Environment 
Information and Observation Network (Eionet) and the international working group on 
biodiversity indicators and monitoring (IWG-BioMIN). These networks provide a 
dataflow of current effective information on nature, biodiversity, and related activities 
and pressures that can be utilized at European level to support action and monitor 
progress to the 2010 target and beyond. 
Finally, all information gathered by the EEA has to be validated and relevant 
policy information at European level that public and policy makers can benefit from it. 
Moreover, all people in need of this information can easily see where the development 
is being made and where more steps must be taken. In addition, this information has to 
broaden the public’s and policy makers’ horizon and push some other actors to improve 
their situation in accordance with the progress and failure regarding the target of halting 
biodiversity loss by 2010.  
In conclusion, after the 1998 Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans, some 
progress has been obtained on biodiversity conservation aims (Baker 2003: 34). Now, it 
is known that biodiversity management is processed via strategic action plans 
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(Biodiversity Strategy and BAPs). First, biodiversity management is now addressed 
through strategic plans (the Biodiversity Strategy; the BAPs). Second, between different 
sectors, EU and all other stakeholders realized the significance of close connection, 
cooperation, and coordination and that is supported at the Council level (the Cardiff 
Process). Third, there are administrative bodies within the Commission (integration 
correspondents; special environmental units within DGs; a CBD team within the 
Environment DG); and some other organizations working in collaboration to reach 
biodiversity conservation targets. Moreover, not only at European or member state 
level, but also at international level, all stakeholders are tied to obligations coming from 
the Rio Earth Summit (in particular those relating to climate change). In addition, there 
are attempts to strengthen the biodiversity conservation policy by integrating 
biodiversity priorities into different policy initiatives (for example in relation to reform 
of the CAP). Finally, the feedback of the implementations of the strategies and BAPs 
becoming an important part of the development of the biodiversity protection and nature 
conservation polices. Community, member states, and some agencies are gathering data 
flows to see how much development is recorded and whether further improvement is 
need or not.  
It should be also noted that the EU has also changed its way of doing or pushing 
member states to implement Biodiversity Strategy and BAPs to increase the success of 
the targets. This is because the first stages of the implementation process for 
biodiversity strategies and action plans were gripping for the Community. Because as 
many mention, the Biodiversity Strategy was seen as top-down approach to the 
biodiversity policy that the EU is insisted on the fulfillment of the CBD obligations. For 
example, the Natura 2000 programme is the key element of Community biodiversity 
strategy. However, although the completion of Natura 2000 network was scheduled by 
2004, many member states couldn’t achieve this target because they couldn’t provide 
the Commission with the lists and accompanying data that is required in order to 
propose a definitive Natura 2000 site list (CEC, 1997:69; EEA, 1995b:114; CEC, 
1995b:57). Therefore, this failure motivated the Commission to start ‘horizontal’ 
actions against member states in relation to the notification of habitat sites under the 
Habitats Directive (CEC, 1998b:70). The Commission has since accepted that 
‘considerable efforts are still required for their establishment and implementation’ 
(CEC, 1999:8). This new horizontal action style can be seen as the necessity to work in 
collaboration with all stakeholders relevant to policy.  Therefore, environmental NGOs 
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have also been forced into litigation at member state level in order to ensure more 
effective implementation (Baker 2003: 35). 
 
 
 
II.2.3. LIFE -Support Community Strategies 
 
 
All these efforts are achieved with some financial instruments that the LIFE is one 
of the most crucial one amongst others. The EU finances projects with this financial 
support instrument for approximately ten years to ensure environmental protection in 
the member states (Regulation, 1973/92/EEC). Regarding biodiversity related issues, 
LIFE Nature, as one of three branches of the LIFE support instrument, has been 
allocated to especially the fulfillment of core directives of biodiversity conservation 
namely Birds and Habitats Directives that will be mentioned in the following parts. As 
summary, it assists the projects related to the establishment and sustainability of Natura 
2000 network of special areas of conservation. LIFE Nature supports mainly the 
biodiversity related projects including management plans that focusing on the measures 
to conserve the habitats and species under risk that is mentioned in the article 6 of the 
Habitats Directive.14  
 
 
 
II.2.4. EU Biodiversity Related Legislation- Birds and Habitats Directives 
 
 
Birds and Habitats Directives shape the core of the legislation related to the EU 
Biodiversity policy. The aim of observing these two directives give us some inspiration 
regarding how the EU functions on biodiversity issue, how relevant legislation is 
formed, how they are implemented, and how is the general understanding in the EU for 
one specific policy.  
In this direction, in many ways, it is clearly seen that both of the biodiversity 
directives emerge with similar factors. Regarding the stakeholders, it can be claimed 
                                                
14
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats 
and of wild fauna and flora, and European Commission Life Focus, Integrated 
management of Natura 2000 sites: the contribution of LIFE-nature projects, p.2,  from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/infoproducts/managingnatura_highres.pdf 
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that for both of them, the same sort of key actors play a vital role in initiating the 
political process. For example, European Commission officials, Members of the 
Parliament (MEPs) (that is, they were the chair or vice-chair of the parliamentary 
committee on the environment), and the campaign officers of several national and 
international environmental groups and public opinion were seen as key entrepreneurs 
in promoting and progressing the Directives (Fairbrass and Jordan 2003:98). In 
consistency with this, in order to see the role of these two directives on biodiversity 
policy, we should analyze the directives more in detail. 
 
 
 
Birds Directive 
 
 
As briefly summarized earlier, the Wild Birds Directive15 is the oldest component 
of biodiversity conservation legislation in the EU. It pre-dates the Community’s 
ratification of the CBD and was originally aimed at more specific goals. Further, it was 
introduced prior to the adoption of the principle of biodiversity conservation as a 
component of EU environmental policy (Baker 2003:30). 
The preparation process of the Birds Directive and its implementation has 
included many participants from wide range of area related to the biodiversity. In 1971, 
questions were discussed in the European Parliament requiring for EU legislation on 
nature conservation. Therefore, the First Action Programme (1973) has referred to the 
biodiversity issues by suggesting the necessity of formal endorsement by member states 
of the several proposals from the Commission. Moreover, in December 1974, the 
Commission has warned member states on their obligations coming from certain 
international agreements (Wils 1994:219). Another motivation on the member states 
was may be public anxiety on the annual slaughter of migratory birds in Southern 
Europe and Northern Africa (Haigh 1997). The adherents of biodiversity protection also 
included some interest groups, including national and international animal protection 
organizations. For example, they started their struggle on biodiversity protection with 
the slogan of ‘Save the Migratory Birds’ and they not only tried to coordinate with other 
interest organizations and work in themselves, they also made their attempts more 
concrete in autumn 1974, by presenting a petition to the European Parliament. This step 
                                                
15
 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds 
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was successful due to the fact that it led the emergence of a Resolution in February 
1975 calling for action (Haigh 1997). In addition, the Commission was not moving to 
shape the Directive and realized the importance of working in connection, cooperation 
and coordination with all relevant stakeholders. In this way, taking consultation from 
nature conservation groups becomes so crucial and making many studies with them 
before the emergence and adoption of the Birds Directive in the early 1970s (Fairbrass 
and Jordan 2003:98). 
While the preparation process was on multi-actor and coordinative environment, 
the Directive had brought a wide range of framework for the conservation and 
protection of the wild bird species in the EU in which there are many components. 
Firstly, the Directive includes some sort of requirements related to habitats conservation 
and in consistency with this aim; it mentions the necessity of designating SPAs 
(Specifically Protected Areas) for migratory and other kinds of bird species under 
threat. Secondly, it points out to some prohibitions on the activities related to the birds’ 
habitat such as intentional destruction of nests and the taking of eggs. Moreover, it 
brings bans on commerce related activities such as trading in live or dead birds. Another 
component of the framework the limitations of hunting the number of species and of the 
hunting periods For example, hunting seasons should not encounter with the periods of 
greatest vulnerability such as return from migration, reproduction and the raising of 
chicks. The rules of hunting also mention the specific methods that these species can be 
hunted (for example, non-selective hunting methods). As it is understood, these are the 
main points that the member states can not ignore regarding formation of their own 
biodiversity protection rules related to birds species under threat.  
After these basic points that shape the Directive’s framework, the implementation 
process also forms an important part of the general biodiversity conservation process. 
As witnessed in the implementation of most EU policies, the Birds Directive, almost a 
decade after it was adopted, had so many problems. The European Parliament 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection Report (1988) 
has pointed to the deficiencies in most EU member states. In consistency with this 
dissatisfaction, therefore, some legal actions are brought in national and EU-level courts 
by the Commission. In general, these court cases focused on some specific issues: for 
example, it could be on member states’ failure to determine an adequate number of 
protected sites. Moreover, it can be related to the derogations that the member states 
issued through erroneous procedures. In addition, the cases can be open due to the lack 
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of conformity between the member states’ legislation and the Directive. In these cases, 
not only EU institutions realized the deficiencies on implementation of the Birds 
Directive, but also these formal channels had come closer and work in coordination 
with some other stakeholders and were in consultation with each other. For example, in 
1983 the Commission had resorted to the infringement proceedings against all EU 
member states due to these failures on implementation of the Birds Directive. More 
importantly, in many of these cases, the infringement proceedings resulted from 
information provided by environmental groups to the Commission (Fairbrass and 
Jordan 2003:100). 
 
 
  
Habitats Directive 
 
 
The Habitats Directive16 forms an important part of Acquis Communitaire related 
to biodiversity legislation and so binding in all member states, although some 
derogations under some strict rules are permitted to some of them. Complementing the 
Birds Directive, it focuses on the habitats of all species under threat and aims to protect 
them.  
When observing the origins of the Habitats Directive, some commentators (Haigh 
2000) go back to the 3rd EAP, and some to the 4th EAP in which the decisions were 
taken by member state governments. At this point, it should be noted that although 
many of the factors motivated the emergence of the Birds Directive were also the same 
for the Habitats Directive, the difference was the time that the latter was on the agenda. 
This time approximately encounters with the late 1980s in that the Community’s 
consideration on environmental issues has strongly begun to change. In this regard, in 
the beginning of 1990s, environmental interest groups have begun to transform 
themselves into more powerful in the meaning of effectiveness. Their capability of 
influencing and utilizing the channels relevant to DG Environment in the Commission 
provided them power and motivation. In learning process of this increasing 
environmental consciousness, these organizations have begun to encourage the public to 
press on the direction of environmental legislation. Moreover, in the early 1990s, most 
                                                
16
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora 
and fauna 
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world widely effective nature conservation groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) had settled in the Brussels by 
opening European liaison offices. In addition to these international organizations, some 
national environmental groups that have no financial capacity as those international 
ones were seen in collaboration and coordination with international or European 
groupings based in Brussels. For example, the Royal Society for Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) began to work through and with BirdLife International to utilize the newly 
emerging EU political opportunities for environmental groups. (Dixon 1998:224; Sharp 
1998:40) 
In addition to this environmental activism in the end of 1980s and the beginning 
of 1990s, the Habitats Directive has come into being with more consciousness. 
Moreover, in this Directive too, the same key stakeholders played significant roles as it 
is witnessed in the Birds Directive. For example, the same environmental interest 
organizations at the national and European level participated the drafting of the 
Directive. Even, the same people were involved in both of the process such as some of 
the MEPs and environmental group officers.  As seen in the Birds Directive, public 
scrutiny was so critical for the Habitats Directive. The time that the Habitats Directive 
was tabled encounters the era that the environmental concerns were highly under 
consideration by the EU due to the greener movement in the Europe. The 1989 
European Parliamentary elections demonstrate to what extent the green vote reactivated 
the political momentum and it motivated the activities of environmental groups. For 
example, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), an environmental 
organization, has put pressure on the EU by strongly affecting members of the public to 
write campaign letters to policy makers (WWF/RSPB joint campaigner 2000). 
Habitats Directive required member states to take some measures and by this way 
conserve and protect the existing natural habitats and wild species of interest to the 
Community. At this point, it should be remembered that the 1998 Biodiversity Strategy 
would mention the need of aligning the all sectors into the environmentally friend 
activities that taking into account of the future of the nature. Moreover, it would advise 
the member states to shape Action Plans that keeping in mind of the biodiversity 
protection concerns of the EU. In this line of thinking, the EU mentions the legal actions 
that can be taken against member states by taking into consideration of Habitats 
Directive. According to this mentality, if a member state does not meet the obligations 
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established in the Habitats Directive, it can be taken to the European Court of Justice 
and given fines for non-compliance.  
In addition to all these, the Habitats Directive is so critical for the nature 
conservation due to its motivation to establish a wide range of protection framework for 
a variety of animals and plants, and for a selection of habitat types. This Community-
wide network of protected habitats, Natura 2000 was initiated by June 1998 with the 
aim of covering SPAs designated under the 1979 Birds Directive and areas proposed by 
Member States under the Habitats Directive. This ecological network targeted the 
‘biogeographical’ and ‘ecological’ regions by dividing the EU territories into the 
combination of specifically protected sites (CEC 1998a: 12–13). 
Moreover, the important area of Natura 2000 can be seen as that these sites 
appropriated by Member States have to be shaped with scientific criteria and data. That 
is to say, all sites in the network must conform to the safeguards set out.17 For example, 
the pre-assessment of some plans and projects related to these sites is needed to be 
done. Are these projects and plans damaging the balance of the site under 
consideration? Or do these projects and plans have so critical interest and there is no 
possibility to find any other solution? At this point it is looked at the chance that these 
plans and programmes are providing some measures to compensate habitats in the event 
of damage. Then these plans and projects can be approved.   
It is worth mentioning that after the objectives of Natura 2000 were put forth, 
many stakeholders began answer these questions in order to warn the decision makers to 
take true decisions by considering the biodiversity priorities on these plans and projects. 
Moreover, all the non-state interest groups and organizations relevant to biodiversity 
conservation have consciousness. They assist the Community on incorrect transposition 
of the Habitats Directive into national law as well. For example, in 1999, in at least five 
member states (including Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Spain and the UK), there were 
some deficiencies regarding transpositions which led to legal proceedings (Europe 
Environment 1999). Moreover, significant delays in reporting of candidate protected 
areas to the Commission have pushed the Community to take legal action against 
member states. In 1998, the Commission announced legal action against nine member 
states for failure to comply with the Habitats Directives (ENDS Daily 1998): Greece, 
                                                
17
 For further information see European Commission Environment DG official web site:  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/home.htm 
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Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark, Germany and Spain 
had failed to report under the Habitats Directive (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2003:100-1).  
 
 
 
II.3. Conclusions- ‘Multilevel Interactions Cycle’ Analysis 
 
 
 
The EU Biodiversity policy establishes the multi-faceted interactions that include 
many participants who direct the policy. These interactions are intensifying especial 
after the Single European Act and becoming concrete steps to shape EU Biodiversity 
policy. All the stakeholders, formal and informal ones namely the Commission, 
Council, ECJ, and other EU institutions relevant to environmental issues and the quasi-
governmental organizations, local administrations, non-state environmental interest 
organizations are beginning to play key role to the environmental legislation from the 
draft stage to the final stages, post implementation processes.  
In consistency with these, the European integration is not only pushing the 
environmental stakeholders to work in coordination, the necessity of working in 
collaboration is also emerging as a fact. As ECNC mentions, regarding the biodiversity 
policy, the stakeholder participation is so critical for the success of the nature protection 
and this collaboration results in a synergy with other (regional or pan-European) 
initiatives. In this line of thinking, the ECNC suggests some sort of a consortium of 
NGOs in the EU Biodiversity Expert Group in order to reactivate the participation of 
particularly the relevant NGOs and the research community for the success of the 
implementation process in the member states. As mentioned before, the biodiversity 
policy is based on especially technical matters and the EU responsibles consider of the 
expert groups. In this line, as one of the expert groups on biodiversity, the ECNC 
provides expertise to the Community related to the ECNC core areas of work so as to 
assist the implementation process and if/when desired work in coordination with the 
European Parliament and with the Presidencies. Generally speaking, the main aims of 
the ECNC can be seen as to follow up the EC Biodiversity Strategy targets and observe 
Biodiversity Action Plans related to the biodiversity conservation policies. 
Moreover, while the EU institutions desire consultation from the expert groups on 
biodiversity, the non-state and informal personal relationships also play a key role for 
the success of working in collaboration to reach biodiversity targets. Personal relations 
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can be clearly seen between EU-level policy makers (that is, officials DG Environment 
and individuals within the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection) and environmental pressure group employees. 
This personal cooperation is extremely important to the policy-making process when 
measured in terms of the policy outcomes (WWF/RSPB joint campaigner 2000, 
BirdLife International 2000 due to the fact that policy process in general take so long 
and while the issues and legislation changes over time the existence of these 
relationships benefit for the success. That is to say, some policy makers (policy 
entrepreneurs) in the Commission and the Parliament were more active than others and 
took leading roles in advancing the biodiversity measures. They play vital role in 
providing the political impetus for the directives. (Fairbrass and Jordan 2003:102). 
Therefore, establishing good communication with such individuals assists the 
environmental organizations and groups to reach true channels in order to affect the 
environmental legislation. Moreover, it is seen that the EU institutions are in favor of 
working with other non-state actors in informal ways. For example, the Commission 
would often prefer not to put their ideas in writing when communicating with 
environmental groups, but tended to make and receive telephone calls (WWF/RSPB 
joint campaigner 2000).  
In addition, the environmental organizations use all relevant information to reach 
their aims. In this direction, most interest groups related to environmental issues know 
who has a beneficial background in the EU. That is to say, some Commission staff had 
a non-state organization employment background, and although the extent to which the 
personal beliefs of the Commission staff could be put into effect was obstructed by 
whatever might be the official Commission policy line, these groups exploit this 
information and was in contact with such a staff. Therefore, these nature conservation 
groups utilize the pro-nature conservation backgrounds that are shaping the official 
standpoint of the Commission in fact.  
For example, the Commission has openly supported one Brussels-based 
environment group (BirdLife International 2000) on a number of issues (for example 
over the issue of hunting and designating protected sites) to such an extent that the 
group’s inventory of bird species now has official status within the Commission as a 
guide to protected sites (Fairbrass and Jordan 2003:102). Another example is the 
environmental groups clearly influence the Commission: one NGO campaigner was 
seconded to the DG Environment for six months during a significant period relating to 
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the initiation process of the Habitats Directive in the early 1990s. The same person was 
a member of the Commission’s (DG Environment) Working Group on the Habitats 
Directive and was seen in the position that sufficiently important for Commission 
officials during working group meetings.  
In addition to these, non-governmental groups have really clear consciousness to 
select suitable individuals to connect. This is because these kinds of relationships 
necessitate so much time and effort. Therefore, these NGOs devote all their effort to 
find true channels, in especially the Commission and the EP, and intensify on them to 
reach the successful results on biodiversity issue. One campaigner employed jointly by 
the WWF and the RSPB to lobby on the Habitats Directive mentions that: “we really 
focused in…on those where we had political connections, established connections, and 
where we thought the action was going on…we knew about what was happening in DG 
XIV [i.e. that there was hostility to the Habitats Directive] but we just didn’t think we 
had a locus there to do anything about it… and DG XI people basically saying ‘they are 
not going to change their minds’…so that was a battle we decided not to fight 
(WWF/RSPB joint campaigner 2000).  
Also, the policy phases (in a cycle) are so critical for the entirety of biodiversity 
targets. That’s to say not only the policy initiation, but also the implementation and after 
that the reports shape the whole policy. Therefore, as it was mentioned before, the 
policy making and implementation should be thought as a discernible multilevel 
interactions cycle and in this cycle all stakeholders play their own role to reach true 
results. As stressed, especially after the mid 1980s, the importances of the necessity of 
carrying on this cycle become critical. Not only the EU institutions, but also the other 
actors in the EU policy game have experienced the ’learning process’ and realized the 
significance of working in cooperation, coordination and connection. As one 
campaigner stressed: 
 
   It was very important to try to get in on the process at the very beginning-if you can find out that 
it is going on-since directives are very difficult to undo. DGXI was the main target. Once the 
Habitats Directive had been agreed, then the main focus of activity returned to the national level 
because of transposition and implementation. The Commission is currently being targeted because 
of its key role in the Natura 2000 sites moderation process. It is likely that focus will shift back 
again once the member states have to undertake the reporting part of the process (Marine 
Conservation Society 2000). 
 
To sum up, EU biodiversity is such a policy area that displays the EU 
policy game played on the multilevel interactions cycle of all related 
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stakeholders. These stakeholders are all the crucial part of this game, and 
they learn the necessity of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation in 
one policy area to reach their aims. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ADAPTATION OF THE UK TO EU BIODIVERSITY POLICY 
 
 
 
III.1. Internal and External Dynamics 
 
 
 
The EU Biodiversity policy is seen one amongst the other Community policies 
that demonstrates how EU functioning is established on the ‘discernible multilevel 
interactions cycle’. It has displayed that the Community’s today policy making and 
implementation processes have been built on the connection, coordination and 
cooperation amongst many relevant actors in order to reach successful policy outcomes. 
This is not a theory but what exactly has been seen from our point of view. The general 
picture indicates the existence of such a network of collaboration between all related 
stakeholders in one policy area. However, the EU is not a government or some other 
kind of state structure. It is composed of member states showing willingness to work 
together with all their parts. That is to say, the member states are also composed of 
many branches in themselves like an atomic structure and all these branches also 
support the centre to push and motivate more multi-actor working style. In order to see 
this synergy amongst the state branches, we have chosen the UK18 to analyze how such 
a unitary state is engaging in European affairs with all its parts, despite its ‘suspicious 
and awkward’ point of view regarding being a member of the EU.   
The UK has a centralist political tradition as it’s well known and the aim of this 
part will be to demonstrate how this centralism trend has begun to shift on the way of 
governance, so to more pluralist tradition. According to our hypothesis, today, EU 
policy processes have been established on the ground of ‘discernible multilevel 
                                                
18
 In this study, the UK and Britain will be used interchangeably.  
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interactions cycle’ and the UK, as one of the most foremost ‘Euroskeptic’, has begun to 
adapt itself to this newly emerging cycle.  
It can be easily claimed that the UK political tradition could be defined as 
intergovernmentalist in the past. The sovereignty of the British state was above 
everything else. The UK saw the central government as the key player in the EU policy 
game and even ignored the other rising powers of supranational bodies in the EU and 
some other stakeholders such as local governments, subnational governments, and non-
state organizations.  Its point of view regarding the EU was so ‘Euroskeptic’ because it 
saw the EU as a kind of economic cooperation in the past. This sort of economic interest 
seeking style of political tradition was established especially with the political styles of 
Conservatist Governments. The UK saw the EU policy game as the ‘zero-sum’ game by 
favoring only the central government. As liberal intergovernmentalists argue, the cost 
and benefit analyses were so critical for the favor of the central state. Consistent with 
these, British state acknowledged that the entrance into the EU was only the result of 
the calculations of the central government by taking into account of only cost and 
benefit analysis. At the time of membership, cost and benefit analysis directed the UK 
to enter into the EU in order to benefit from this organization’s economic advantages. It 
analyzed the membership on ‘high-politics and low-politics’ dilemma. It understood 
that at the low politics issues, especially regarding Community pillar, Britain could 
cooperate, but at high politics issues, state sovereignty should be conserved by refusing 
the cooperation.  
However, this sort of intergovernmentalism has been replaced with newly 
emerging arena of state behaviors. After the emergence of Single European Act, all 
Member State behaviors have transformed to differing extents. The UK has begun to 
take the significance of supranational bodies into consideration more than before due to 
institutional arrangements favoring supranational bodies, especially European 
Parliament. The UK Westminster and Whitehall has begun to adapt itself to Acquis 
Communitaire more than before.  
In addition, the newly emerging discussion arena that has been created by 
multilevel governance approach has enlightened the EU studies and opened a channel 
for us to observe British politics after the EU membership of this country. This 
approach has envisaged that, especially from the Single European Act onwards, the 
state behaviors have transformed due to the necessity to adapt themselves to European 
politics. It has reflected the philosophy of pluralism in policy processes in the EU and 
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Member States. That’s to say, from this time on, the policy processes would include 
many stakeholders related to the policy arena. For example, if it is biodiversity policy, 
there would be environment branches of the EU institutions, central governments, 
subnational governments, and non-state actors in the policy game. This means, today, 
the UK, like other Member States, has experienced the learning process of adaptation to 
the EU and it has, rather slowly, transformed its policy making, implementation and 
after-implementation styles on the way of ‘multilevel interactions cycle’. British state 
has begun to change its political tradition by making some institutional, constitutional 
and political arrangements. The UK has shifted from the strictly centralist political style 
to more moderate ‘governance’ style taking all relevant stakeholders into the policy 
game and paying attention to their values adding to the success of these policies. 
With these arguments, in this chapter, first we have to analyze the state’s political 
nature by referring Westminster, Whitehall, Centre-Local relations and Devolution 
issue. Later it will be witnessed that something has been changing in the UK and it is 
entering into new phase with the external pressure of the EU. The degree of 
transformation is not our issue, but we try to show this transformation by touching upon 
the functioning of the state regarding biodiversity policy. The next steps will be based 
on Britain’s policy making and implementation with the EU’s on biodiversity issue. 
Finally, the entire picture of changing environment in the British politics will be placed 
into multilevel interactions cycle argument. 
 
 
 
 III.1.1. Understanding the UK Politics 
 
 III.1.1.1. Westminster and Whitehall 
 
 
The image seen in the political style of the Britain in post-war Europe can be 
defined as the domination of Westminster (ministers) and Whitehall (civil servants) in a 
centralized authority. They were both shaping the core executive and therefore in this 
period they were most powerful players of the ‘policy making and implementation 
game’. It can be argued that the general picture of British political life was based on 
‘centralized top-down structure’. Although this picture begins to change after the mid-
1980s, will be mentioned in the next parts, there is a need to observe this centralized 
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top-down structure more in detail to clearly demonstrate to what extent the policy style 
has changed.  
In the Westminster model, the constitutional position is that ministers decide, 
whilst officials advise and ministers then answer to Parliament (Richards and Smith 
2002: 200). The general opinion in this system is that officials are apolitical and they do 
not reflect their own personal and political judgments to this advice.  However, when it 
is closely analyzed it is seen that ministers and officials work in collaboration and 
dependent each other on policy outcomes. The reality demonstrates that due to that fact 
that the resources of ministers and officials are different, they have to exchange this 
information and work in cooperation.19 Moreover, these officials have ministerial 
coverage due to the fact that while ministers involve in specific policy decisions, 
officials involve in making decisions within a constitutionally informed framework 
(Richards and Smith 2002:201). 
In this kind of symbiotic relationship, the general presumption defines 
Westminster model as ‘club of government’ (Marquand 1991; Dunleavy 1999; Judge 
1999). This means the Westminster system of government is favorable for both officials 
and ministers accept to work in an environment that officials advise and ministers 
decide. This sort of relationship comes from the idea that being a good official passes 
through knowing the ministers’ mind. They have to work as a one brain to be successful 
on policy making process and this in turn shapes the centralized and top-down 
sentiments in the state. Both of them gain from this centralized top-down game in that 
officials become more expert in terms of policy making and bureaucratic process, 
loyalty and the ability to protect ministers, and ministers on the other hand brought the 
political authority for officials to act (Richards and Smith 2002: 202).  
However, it will be seen that this symbiotic interactive relationship based on 
consultation and negotiation amongst ministers and officials in the Westminster model 
begins to change since mid-1970s, and ministers have become more proactive by 
increasingly willing to utilize the advice from outside Whitehall sources.  Civil servants 
have increasingly taken on a managerial role and emphasis in Whitehall has drifted 
from policy expertise to more influential policy implementation. 
It is clear that Britain remains still centralized political system but the impact of 
governance become so clear on the structure, organization and culture of government 
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 For further information see D., Richards and M.J. Smith, Governance and Public 
Policy in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.201, table 9.1 
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machine in the last two decades. Our stress is not on stability of power structures, but on 
the additional actors on the policy play. It is known that before 1997, the state system 
was even more centralized as it was established on the cooperation of Westminster and 
Whitehall. The other branches of the central government were not on stake. For 
example, local government had no constitutional autonomy, and what it had been given 
by custom and practice was taken back by conservative governments. Moreover, local 
government finances were always under control of central government, and its functions 
were reduced by reforms that created a variety of new quasi-autonomous agencies, 
while some other functions were privatized. (George and Bache 2001:183). However, 
today this central role of the Westminster and Whitehall are circumscribed by all other 
stakeholders and politics is begun to be played out over many different terrains 
involving a wide array of disparate actors (Marks et al. 1995; Smith 1999; Jessop 2002; 
Pierre and Peters 2000). At this point, in order to see governance trend in UK political 
system more clearly, we should also look at the changing roles of subnational 
authorities in this state.  
 
 
 
III.1.1.2. Local Government 
 
 
 The 1979-1997 periods of UK politics under successive Conservative 
governments demonstrates that intervention was some sort of inevitable reality. 
Although this intervention or control is too elusive to be proved, the general attitude of 
conservative governments in this period was the inclination to weaken and bypass 
elected local authorities and empower consumers.  As Michael Loughlin (1996:417) 
indicates the general point of view in these periods was to reject local authorities ‘roles 
as being the institutions of governance, but seeing them as the agencies for delivering 
centrally-determined policies’. 
However, after 1997 period, many things have changed so clearly that the 
government supported the idea of empowering partnerships that in fact establishes the 
new framework of governance system in the UK from this time on. As it is seen, after 
the election of New Labor in 1997 and the newly aimed platform of constitutional 
reform has brought new political and institutional agendas in front of the policy makers. 
The changes in the roles of local government may have far-reaching and unpredictable 
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consequences for relations between subnational and central government institutions and 
the EU. (Pearce and Martin 2003:62). 
In this direction, the Labor Party’s general election manifesto, New Labor-
Because Britain Deserves Better, indicated the necessity of better relations between 
central and local government. This manifesto says that: “Local decision-making should 
be less constrained by central government, and also more accountable to local 
people…[councils] should work in partnership with local people, local business and 
local voluntary organizations. They will have the powers necessary to develop these 
partnerships.” (p.34) at this point it should be realized that the extent to which the power 
of decision making is given to local authorities still under discussion. However, point is 
that, this initiation was the sign of a trend in understanding centre-local relations in the 
UK. There is discernible willingness to work in collaboration with all branches of the 
state under partnership. The sharp difference between the understanding of pre-1997 
governments and after that is the inclination towards working with subnational 
authorities.  
It is widely accepted that many of the issues encountering local communities 
require a more coordinated cross-cutting response by UK central and local government, 
which may necessitate increased decentralization of administrative responsibilities and 
devolution. After 1997, it is realized that new initiatives and change programs were 
shaped by central government to join-in the local authorities to revitalize local 
democratic processes and improve local services. Ministers began to search for a 
fundamental change in the culture of local government, willing that it will provide more 
citizen-centered services and stronger community leadership (Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions [DETR] (Pearce and Martin 2003:66). 
In addition, many councils have begun to play different roles in the trend of 
governance that they are granted new action zones, pilot initiatives, and pathfinder 
experiments designed to promote greater partnership between local service providers, 
the private and community sectors. As it was mentioned, the Westminster and Whitehall 
have found themselves in this new arena that they are now trying to implement this 
plethora of new domestic initiatives and programs in collaboration with local 
authorities. Since 1997, these actors have realized the importance of European arena for 
exerting influence or gaining any room for maneuvering on policy making and 
implementation realm (Pearce and Martin 2003:66). 
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At sub-national level in the UK, in the last two decades saw a definite shift from 
local government to local governance in which elected local authorities have become 
one other player amongst all ‘governing’ bodies. This is clear in Blair’s wordings that 
(1998:10): ‘There are all sorts of players on the local pitch jostling for position where 
previously the local council was the main game in town’. Therefore, while the amount 
of power shifted from centre to local is not our issue here; more important is that the 
governance trend begins to settle in the political consciousness of the UK. Moreover, it 
is acknowledged that governing Britain today: ‘is a more complex and challenging task 
that ever before. Collective interests are defined and pursued at four different 
institutional levels: the local authority, the regions, the state and the EU (Pierre and 
Stoker 2000: 29). 
 
 
 
III.1.1.3. Devolution 
 
 
While the policy arena begins to transform such a way, it should be realized that 
the devolution issue is the fact contributing in different manners to the UK political life. 
Devolution can be defined as the transfer of power from central government to 
subordinate regional bodies, without (unlike federalism) leading to shared sovereignty 
(Heywood 1997:404). This means passing powers or duties down from a higher 
authority to a lower one. In UK this devolution debate starts in the late 1960s with the 
revival of Scottish and Welsh nationalism (Heywood 1997:131). While Scotland and 
Wales (to a lesser extent) had traditionally retained a degree of administrative 
devolution, it was 1997 before a political devolution accompanied this (George and 
Bache 2001:183). 
The increasing governance wave absorbed the relations between the centre and 
the devolved assemblies as well. In this direction, the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament, assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, the Greater London Authority, 
and unelected assemblies in each of the eight English regions represents a rapidly 
changing nature of internal constitutional arrangements in the UK. These devolved 
structures with ‘denationalization of statehood’ and the ‘territorialization of political 
power’, to varying degrees, brought new channels to them by suggesting new 
opportunities for more direct communication with the EU (Pierce and Martin 2003:64). 
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According to Pierce and Martin: ‘the outcome may be a fundamental shift in central-
local roles and relations, with major consequences for subnational government 
involvement in the growing range of EU policies that interface with domestic priorities 
at the subnational level’ (2003:64). 
Again our intention is not to calculate the degree of power relations in this system, 
but major aim is that to demonstrate the transforming picture of centre-local relations. 
Moreover, it is the reality that there is an asymmetric nature of devolution in that, for 
example, the Scottish Executive has much greater powers than its Welsh counterpart, 
whereas elected English regional assemblies have far less autonomy than that of the 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly (Pearce and Martin 2003:64). Therefore, all 
these stakeholders of the centre experiences new form of multilevel interactions cycle in 
that all of them begin to learn integrating their policies and motivating new institutional 
interactions and processes to reach the desired outcomes in favor of all participants. 
In addition, in this new system of multilevel interactions cycle, the learning 
process also affects the devolved administrations to see the opportunity of EU more 
clearly. That’s to say all the English regions begin to be part of EU process by opening 
offices in Brussels, usually funded by a range of regional stakeholders. Increasingly, 
these offices are seen not just as listening posts and information on gatherers but as 
active lobbyists for their regions in the EU institutions and as participants in debates 
about European strategy in the regions (Pearce and Martin 2003:65).  
While the density of interactions of subnational governments by bypassing the 
centre is newly emerging issue, indeed this issue is so open to conflict between central 
government and the newly devolved bodies about their respective relationships with 
Brussels. In line with this, the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK 
government, Scottish ministers, and the Welsh Assembly can be seen as one of the 
attempts to stress on the responsibilities and powers of the different institutions and the 
need for coordination their interaction with the EU (HM Government 1999a; Scott 
2000). Moreover, in England same kinds of concerns are on table promoting regional 
protocols or concordats to help clarify the roles and responsibilities of the key partners. 
(Pearce and Martin 2003:65). Therefore, there is not a point of separation between the 
centre and subnational governments on the engagement of subnational governments into 
the European agenda, but there is clear support from the centre to clarify the shape and 
degree of partnerships in order to see the certain roles of devolved administrations. 
From that point, it can be argued that working in partnerships and in collaboration is the 
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trend that all stakeholders support and in deed creating the picture of what this study 
tries to demonstrate: ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’. 
After all these arguments, it is now more clear that the new devolved bodies will 
have a distinct and specific role to play as ‘third-level’ sub-state governments in policy 
arenas. The overall scope for action will be constrained by the fact that within the EU 
political system the devolved administrations would engage as ‘regional’ actors in a 
system of governance where the locus of legislative power lies at the EU level (Carter 
2003: 2). However, from this time on, they are in the European Union game and part of 
the European puzzle. 
In summary, the UK policy making and implementation style is evolving towards 
the multilevel interactions game in that the UK has to motivate close relations with the 
subnational authorities in order to affect the formulation of the UK’s policy position. 
This can also be defined as a ‘symbiotic relationship’ in that the subnational 
governments also supporting the close interaction, cooperation and coordination with 
the centre and other local authorities. It is known that pre-devolution UK was based on 
the centralized top-down policy making and implementation position of the Whitehall at 
the heart of UK Government (Bulmer and Burch 1998). However, post-devolution 
environment made the central system more take into account of the devolved levels as 
well (S Bulmer, M Burch, C Carter, P Hogwood and A Scott  2002). 
 
 
 
III.1.2. The EU Membership and the Alignment with the EU Environmental 
Governance system 
 
 
   Twenty years ago political institutions and political leaders were much more self-reliant, and it 
was assumed-for good reasons-that the state governed Britain. Today, the role of the government 
in the process of governance is much more contingent. Local, regional and national political 
elites alike seek to forge coalitions with private businesses, voluntary associations and other 
societal actors to mobilize resources across the public-private border in order to enhance their 
chances of guiding society towards politically defined goals (Pierre and Stoker 2000:29).                                     
 
As touched on in previous parts, the centralized top-down approach of British 
policy making and implementation style begins to change approximately after mid 
1980s. Slowly, the most clearly realized attitude in British political life is that the policy 
arena starts to become more crowded and the process of interactions, cooperation and 
coordination begins to shape political life in wide variety of areas. The Westminster and 
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Whitehall begins to become one amongst the all stakeholders related to different policy 
arena. This clearly signs the shift from government to governance in the UK and this 
shift happens in an unchangeable manner. Therefore, the British political life begins to 
enter into new phase of ‘inevitable and unchangeable governance wave’ with all other 
member states in Europe.  
Of course, the membership to EU has motivated strongly this new process in the 
UK. As it is seen, the UK political life has experienced some institutional shifts in itself. 
Moreover, the effects of Europeanization begin to make the Britain to feel more as part 
of the Europe. That is to say the UK after the membership to the EU, especially after 
mid-1980s, realized that the EU way is irreversible in that it has to align its policies with 
the EU. Because, as it was stressed on before, the membership is not an obligation for 
all European states. These member states are consciously willing to be its part and 
therefore, after this process they begin to learn the necessities that being a member of a 
Community brings many obligations. These are felt especially in institutional way of 
doings and also in policy arena. After demonstrating the changing nature of British 
political life, at this point, with an example of biodiversity policy, we have to point out 
how is policy shift is experienced in the UK in order to make more concrete the general 
picture of the functioning of the EU in line with the ‘discernible multilevel interactions 
cycle’ argument. 
As known commonly, Britain is seen as an ‘awkward partner’ in relation to 
European affairs. This definition expresses many arguments in itself. However, it is 
enough for us to mention that Britain was seen one of the important political players in 
Europe and it was away from the Community from the beginning its establishment. It 
was always, and still, the Eurosceptic against the Community policies. Therefore, its 
political culture was a bit different from the continental Europe. It had some special 
priorities, external and internal, regarding its distance from the Continental Europe. 
However, the EU process also covered it and after the membership in 1973, it again 
becomes the major player in the process of integration. Before membership, in post-war 
Britain, the problem of economic decline, and the attempts of successive governments 
to halt decline and to modernize the economy were major issues. In this line of thinking, 
According to George and Bache, the membership of the EC was thought as part of the 
process of modernization. That is to say, membership was seen as a tool to reach 
economic targets, not as a valuable end in itself (2001: 181). 
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While Britain was some sort of skeptic for the membership, post-membership 
process was also an ‘awkward process’ for the country. For some time, it insisted on its 
own policy making and implementation style. However, then, in the learning process of 
the membership, it began to combine old traditions with new styles in the EU. 
Regarding environmental policy, it experienced some tensions with the continental 
Europe due to the Britain’s own traditions.  
The entry into the Community in 1973 encountered with the 1st EAP that insisted 
on member states to harmonize regulation policy on the one hand, and minimize the 
interference with free trade and competition on the other. At this point, the tensions 
began to arouse on the styles of Britain and the continental Europe. While the Britain 
preferred voluntary regulation style, continental system was using standard setting 
legislation style. In this direction, the Britain continued its own tradition till the mid-
1980s by implementing the environmental rules under its own law with some kind of 
administrative changes. However, as Carter and Lowe indicate, ‘gathering pace of 
European environmental policy making increased the pressures for the integration of 
British policy into a European framework’ (Carter and Lowe 1998:30).  
It is not difficult to argue that the British policy priorities had to be consistent with 
its economic and industrial targets pragmatically, so it supported the existing regulatory 
tradition in the country regarding Environmental policies of EU until the period that the 
country has learned the necessities have to be fulfilled to be really part of the Union. In 
this learning process, Britain realized that the European policies and its own legal 
framework, based on the superiority of Community law on the national laws, began to 
have strong influence British political life.  Therefore, as it is stressed previously, the 
British political tradition has shifted from strong government to governance, and also its 
policies has shifted from voluntary regulations style to more standardized legal 
framework of the EU. That’s to say, ‘the UK government has also been obliged to 
crystallize and formalize national policy’ (Lowe and Ward 1998).  
In addition that shifts in environmental policy, more concrete transformation were 
experienced regarding environmental administration in the UK after the membership. 
As it was stressed before, the effect of empowerment of subnational governments were 
seen in environmental policy sphere. Especially, the centralization and decentralization 
were experienced simultaneously in that private sector organizations, agencies and 
central government departments gained more power and this has led to third level of 
regional environmental administration and government.  
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In addition to the appearance of subnational environmental structures as 
significant stakeholders in environmental issues in Britain, the state’s entry into the EC 
has also contributed to the roles of the environmental NGOs as another party regarding 
the multilevel environmental interactions cycle. This newly created arena for 
environmental groups has opened up the channels to reach the EU directly in order to 
put pressure on the UK. As an example, pressure groups can have the new instrument of 
judicial review: they can appeal to the ECJ to require the British Government to 
implement EC Directives. Moreover, British pressure groups have made more use of 
EC institutions that their counterparts in other member countries (Carter and Lowe 
1998:30). 
Therefore, the mid- 1980s was the turning point both for the central government 
and also for other stakeholders related to environmental policy. From this time on, the 
Europeanization of environmental policy of Britain has demonstrated the fact that 
Community environmental legislation superseded the national environmental 
legislations and so affected the national rules and procedures fundamentally regarding 
environmental issues. Moreover, subnational governments and environmental NGOs 
have begun to be seen as a ‘watchdogs’ of the implementation processes of the 
Community environmental directives in the member states. These non-state actors 
began to bypass the central government in the way of reaching the EU environmental 
agenda. Furthermore centre began to lose its controlling power over flow of information 
regarding environmental issues and domination on policy processes. This newly 
emerging situation motivated the governance process in which the mutual interests are 
established.  
Consistent with these, the 1980s newly increasing party politicization has also 
affected the governance process and pushed the parties to take into consideration of 
greener policies. In this direction, although as McCormick (1991) asserts, ‘Britain has 
the oldest, strongest, best-organized and most widely supported environmental lobby in 
the world’ (p.34), the lobby activities contributed to the party politicization of the 
environment in 1980s. The major politicians necessitate replying the environmental 
concerns and campaigns coming from environmental groups and the increasing degree 
of critical media coverage of environmental issues. In the end, this sort of consciousness 
of politicians benefited to more open societies in which the public opinion, media, 
interest groups and all other stakeholder regarding environmental policy work in 
cooperation, coordination and interaction in a multilevel policy processes.  
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In summary, since the 1980s, British environmental policy has entered into a 
‘slow but profound change’, which has gradually pushed for a much more 
‘Europeanized’ system of control. The Europeanization of national environmental 
policy has pressed on the UK to harmonize its approach with continental axioms of 
control (Jordan, Wurzel, Zito, Brückner 2003:183). 
From the EU side, the EU’s environmental polices can be seen as typically the 
outcome of the conflict and compromise between all stakeholders ,state and non-state 
actors situated at the local, national, regional, and international levels. This sort of 
complex, conflicting, and evolving dispersion of authority and competences is one of 
the most intriguing features of EU environmental governance. (Fairbrass and Jordan 
2004:148). Some scholars have analyzed this kind of interactions network by utilizing 
the concept of multilevel governance (Sbragia 1998; Weale et al.2000; Jordan 2002a). 
However, our discussion point is not to see the EU Environmental policy, particularly 
biodiversity issue, from the concepts’ point of view, but to try to demonstrate the 
general way of understanding how Community policies are shaped and implemented in 
member states.  
At this point, the UK becomes the crucial case to see this discernible multilevel 
interactions cycle arguments due to its extremely centralist unitary state structure and 
the subservient positions of all other the state branches and non-state actors to it.  Our 
intention is to focus on changing institutional and policy shifts in this country on the 
way of EU with the motivation of governance trend.   
In the end, Britain has traditionally approached European negotiations with great 
skepticism (Wallace 1995). In addition, in many policy areas, the central government 
has seen itself ‘away’ from and at odds with continental Europe (Wallace 1997). 
Therefore, changes in traditions have happened slowly but profoundly. Golub (1995) 
exemplifies that the British judiciary, encouraged by an ambivalent public, has retarded 
legal integration by refusing to make references to the ECJ.  Moreover, it can be argued 
that the UK government has been get used to work in favor of the single market and its 
attendant measures (Moravscik 1998:324-5), so it would readily accept or promote 
those EU policies that would move further market liberalization. However, on the other 
hand, it would resist those policies that do not directly assist in achieving these 
objectives or are themselves, potentially, a constraint on economic development, such 
as environmental regulation (Moravscik 1998:319; Jordan 2002b). When we thought of 
the EU’s regulatory and standardized nature of environmental policy, the conflict or 
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some problems that the UK would experience at the beginning, while adopting itself to 
the Community, was inevitable.  This is completely related to what Lowi presents in his 
typology in that ‘redistributive policies typically involve a relatively open competition 
for (newly distributed) resources (Lowi 1964), whereas regulatory policies tend to be 
more narrowly drawn and conflictual in nature’. 
However, as witnessed in the following parts, the 1980s ‘Dirty Man of Europe’ 
will align itself to the EU’s environmental standards while Europeanizing its policy 
arena in general. Such a centralist state will have to acknowledge the existence of some 
other actors in the EU game and realize its circumscribing control power over the 
environmental policy making, implementation and post-implementation processes.  
 
 
 
III.2. Implementation of UK Biodiversity Policy 
 
 
 
 In out example, UK biodiversity policy points out mainly to aims that the state 
fulfills the obligations arousing out of the requirements of the EU due to its membership 
and at the same time Convention on Biological Diversity due to its signatory position in 
the Rio Summit in 1992 apart from the Union. Therefore, the implementation of 
biodiversity requirements emerges both from the EU and UN, and this situation is not 
contradictory but complementary. In fact, the biodiversity policy starts when the Birds 
Directive was adopted in 1979, and later on the Rio Summit is the critical turning point 
with its pressure on all signatories to take biological concerns carefully. Then Habitats 
Directive in 1992 motivates and opens up a channel for EU member states to behave on 
certain biodiversity strategy by directing them to shape biodiversity action plans.  
 
 
 
III.2.1. Key Priorities of the UK Biodiversity Conservation Policy 
 
 
At this point, it can be argued that biodiversity conservation has some key 
priorities in the UK such as auditing, shaping priorities, putting objectives and targets, 
establishing biodiversity action plans, and monitoring and review of all implementation 
processes. When analyzing the UK biodiversity policy in its official web site, the UK 
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government has accomplish the auditing based on existing biodiversity data and place it 
to the wider international context. Moreover, through the scientific data- that is so 
crucial for the better implementation that mentioned before- the state defines its 
priorities by designating species and habitats under threat in order to reach biodiversity 
conservation aim.  
On the designation of these species and habitats, the main objectives and targets 
are established to see the final point against which progress can be measured.  In this 
direction, the main framework for working on these priorities, objectives and targets the 
biodiversity action plans are arranged. Again, through scientific tools, a list of threats to 
the species and habitats, a statement of the objectives and specific actions to be 
implemented are written down. For example, between 1995 and 1999, a total of 391 
Species and 45 Habitats have been shaped and this list has been published by the 
government as a road map. These were the species and habitats designated under UK 
biodiversity priorities. Moreover, a 'Lead Partner' (for Species Action Plans) or a 
statutory 'Lead Agency' (for Habitat Action Plans) has been found to catalyze plan 
implementation and reporting. The RSPB has been assigned with this role that will be 
mentioned how it engaged in the biodiversity conservation efforts of the UK.  
 The final process for the biodiversity policy in the UK includes the monitoring 
and review phase in that current data on the progress in targets, actions and the 
distribution of resources are observed to see how much development is gone through in 
the general biodiversity conservation framework. This progress is watched by policy 
reviews, such as the UK Biodiversity Group has completed its first review of progress 
on biodiversity action plans in 1999. This was summarized in 'Sustaining the variety of 
life: 5 years of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan' which was published in March 2001. 
The second review was completed in 2002 and the results of these reviews are found at 
the UK BAP website.   
 
 
 
III.2.2. Fertile Land to See ‘Multilevel Interactions Cycle’ 
 
 
The part of this study regarding all these attempts is not to demonstrate the degree 
of success that these phases foreseen, but to indicate how the biodiversity conservation 
has become a policy arena in which wide variety of actors at different levels collaborate 
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to reach the biodiversity aims. Therefore, the EU biodiversity policy in relation to the 
UK is a suitable case study exploring multilevel interactions cycle, for several reasons. 
First of all, the nature of the biodiversity policy gives motivation to see this complex 
multi-actor based system of interaction because biodiversity issue is a kind of policy 
arena in that all relevant stakeholders have to work in connection, cooperation and 
coordination to reach targeted results. This is the arena in which the problems and 
solutions affect so many other policy areas due to its priority of people’ daily lives.  
Second is the situation that EU policy makers encounter with necessity of the picture of 
multilevel interactions by pulling all relevant stakeholders to take action on European 
arena. Thirdly, this European arena becomes the opportunity for the UK nature 
conservation groups to reactivate its policies in different political environment away 
from the national levels. As mentioned before, the biodiversity policy deserves technical 
and scientific know-how, so European Union institutions, especially the Commission, 
require data from these conservation groups. Such a need becomes some sort of 
motivation for the environmental NGOs in the UK to work directly with the EU 
institutions. These kinds of interaction and cooperation can be seen as favorable for 
both sides in that the Commission may expect to gain political support coming from the 
alliances with pro-biodiversity protection groups in order to counteract the opposition 
from counter-groups (that is, hunters and gun clubs) and hostile member state 
governments. On the other hand, the environmental groups find fertile lands to work 
actively on the way of their aims. The marginalization of environmental groups and the 
domination of the agricultural policy community in the UK also prove to be a decisive 
factor in inducing alliance building (Fairbrass and Jordan 2003:96). 
 
 
 
III.2.3. UK Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) 
 
 
Under the light of these biodiversity priorities of the UK, when we turn back to 
the initiation of UK Biodiversity Action Plan, it is seen that, in 1992, the CBD, the 
outcome of Rio Summit, was signed by the UK Government in that the signatories 
stayed under the commitment of 'developing national strategies, plans or programmes 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity' (Article 6A). In order to 
reach that end, the Government published its own strategy in 1994 - Biodiversity: The 
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UK Action Plan (DoE, 1994). According to English Nature, this plan was revolutionary 
due to the fact that it was combining new and existing conservation initiatives with the 
emphasis on a ‘partnership’ approach20. 
After this process, the Biodiversity Steering Group report, published in 1995, 
shaped the general framework of UK biodiversity priorities, objectives and targets, and 
action plans. It was some sort of road map for the UK including species and habitats 
under danger, the formation of the action plans and the selection of lead partner and 
lead agency roles to coordinate the implementation of each plan.                               
 
 
 
III.2.4. Biodiversity Policy Process 
 
 
The UK Biodiversity Action Plans are the main tools for the biodiversity policy in 
this country. However, as discussed above, the Birds and Habitats Directives were the 
most crucial legislative tools of the Community to push member states into a position 
that all the member states fulfill their commitments related to biodiversity conservation 
issue. That is to say, the UK BAPs have to be in line with the Birds and Habitats 
Directive. When we look at the process which the Birds and Habitats Directives has 
come to the UK’s policy agenda, it is seen that the Birds Directive was proposed in 
December 1976 but not finally adopted until April 1979 (Haigh 1997:Chp. 9.2-5). The 
long delay came into being because of the opposition from member states with pro-
hunting lobbies. However, the UK government, represented by the Department of the 
Environment 21 (DOE), approves the proposal ‘with little hesitation’ (Haigh and 
Lanigan 1995:22). Because as it was touched upon before, this period was the UK’s 
adaptation to the Community and so using existing policies in mixture with the new 
                                                
20
 For further information see, English Nature, Biodiversity Action Plans. ‘From Rio-the 
background’, from http://www.english-nature.org.uk/Baps/rio.htm 
 
21
 Prior to 1997 the UK ministry responsible for environmental matters was the 
Department of the Environment (DOE). His was renamed the Department fort he 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in 1997 after the election of a Labour 
government. Subsequently, following the general election of 2001, central government 
departments have been reorganized. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) is now responsible for environmental issues. 
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initiatives. The UK has thought that Birds Directive has not included the initiatives 
which the UK couldn’t use its own national strategy and tools.  
On the other hand, after a decade, in September 1988, the Commission proposed 
the Habitats Directive. The political agreement has been reached nearly after 3 years, in 
December 1991. During negotiations, certain states, including the UK, were more 
careful related to the obligations that the Directive would bring to member states due to 
their ‘rancour’ emerged with the cases opened up by the ECJ with regard to the Birds 
Directive.22 (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2003:100) 
In consistency with this issue, as early as 1983, the Commission had begun to 
reply to the increasing complaints about the implementation deficiencies coming from 
nature conservation groups. In the end, the Commission has initiated infringement 
proceedings against every single member state. As a reminder, EU level legal action23 
has focused on three main issues: non-designation of candidate SPAs, derogations, and 
the transposition of the Directive to national laws. In line with these, Commission has 
taken some legal actions against member states. For example, regarding the UK’s 
                                                
22
 ECJ rulings during the 1990s led to a more intrusive and demanding biodiversity 
policy than many of the EU member state governments would have liked 
 
23
 “Article 226 of the Treaty permits the Commission to take action against a Member 
State that is not complying with its obligations. If the Commission considers that there 
may be an infringement of EU law that warrants the opening of an infringement 
procedure, it addresses a "Letter of Formal Notice" (first written warning) to the 
Member State concerned, requesting it to submit its observations by a specified date, 
usually two months. In the light of the reply or absence of a reply from the Member 
State concerned, the Commission may decide to address a "Reasoned Opinion" (final 
written warning) to the Member State. This clearly and definitively sets out the reasons 
why it considers there to have been an infringement of EU law and calls upon the 
Member State to comply within a specified period, usually two months. If the Member 
State fails to comply with the Reasoned Opinion, the Commission may decide to bring 
the case before the Court of Justice. Article 228 of the Treaty gives the Commission 
power to act against a Member State that does not comply with a previous judgement of 
the European Court of Justice. The article also allows the Commission to ask the Court 
to impose a financial penalty on the Member State concerned” for further information 
see European Commission, “Commission takes legal action against six member states 
over Wild Birds and Habitats Directives”, http://europa.eu.int,  IP/02/1923, Brussels, 19 
December 2002 
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situation related to the cases, in 1989, the ECJ ruled in the case CEC v. Federal 
Republic of Germany with the UK intervening a.k.a. Leybucht Dykes (C-57/89). 
Mainly, the ECJ‘s considerations in this case was to elevate ecological considerations 
over economic ones during the designation and development of protected sites (Ball 
1997:217). Another case was the Lappel Bank case in that employing the principles 
supported the above case, the ECJ ruled against the UK Government in July 1996. This 
case was brought against the UK Government by RSPB and the ECJ ruled that the 
government’s way of doing was incorrect that it separated an area of land from a SPA to 
permit the construction of a nearby port. At this point, the Court supported a much more 
maximal interpretation of EU law than the UK had expected. Crucially, these cases have 
come to the EU’s agenda with the information coming from the environmental, such as 
RSPB, which had consciously adopted a ‘watchdog’ role (RSPB 2000).  
The outcome of such cases on the UK government was that it had entered into a 
learning process, pushing the state to take biodiversity considerations into account and 
to approach new directives more warily. After these cases and with the learning process, 
the UK Government has understood that the form of a biodiversity policy is entirely 
different (namely, unexpected and undesirable) from what the government has assumed. 
That is to say, biodiversity has unintended consequences which the government 
couldn’t predict beforehand. According to Sharp (1998), the decisions taken by the 
Court on Leybucht Dykes clearly shocked DoE officials and moreover, the Lappel Bank 
ruling was similarly unwelcome. Therefore, the unintended consequences of these cases 
were realized clearly by the UK in the learning process of a country on the way of its 
adaptation to the EU. From this time on, the DoE have begun to pay more attention to 
the policy process and implementation of Habitats Directive.  
Of course, the experiences learned from the ruling of these cases had motivated 
the UK to approach the biodiversity concerns faithfully, but the incorrect 
implementations continued after the adaptation of the Habitats Directive as well. In 
2004, the Commission has taken legal action against eight Member States, including the 
UK, with the aim of protecting and conserving biodiversity in Europe.24 In the part that 
is related to UK, it is seen that; 
                                                
24
 “The Member States in question are Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom. These Member States have, in different ways, 
not ensured sufficient protection of wild birds, habitats and species protected under the 
EU's Habitats and Wild Birds Directives. Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy are requested 
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   the Commission gives a final written warning to the UK due to its incorrect and deficient 
implementation of the priorities mentioned in Habitats and Birds Directive. According to these 
Directives, there is clearly defined prohibition of trading in protected sites, but the implementation 
of the UK is not clear enough related to this ban. More in detail, the UK's legislation only contains 
those species concerned whose natural range covers Great Britain. Moreover, certain game birds 
are not still completely enclosed by the provision on the ban on trade. In line with this warning, the 
UK authorities committed to the adoption of new legislation, but the Commission has not yet seen 
this.25 
  
As shown, the environmental groups, private bodies, national organizations and 
bodies and the Community institutions are playing their roles to a varying degree. Here, 
the main concern is not mention the positive outcomes reached by these all 
stakeholders. However, the aim is to indicate who are in the game of EU biodiversity 
policy in coordination and cooperation with each other. As observed, the Community 
institutions intervene the implementation and post-implementation processes completely 
with the help of member states. However, although member states are the key players in 
the policy process in general, they were not the single actors in the process. In line with 
this, biodiversity policy process was a process that brought national (UK) based 
environmental NGOs into direct contact with EU policy-makers and Brussels-based 
environmental NGOs. This direct relationship with EU institutions, especially with 
Commission and the Parliament, has been seen some sort of long term investment for 
these environmental groups saw. These groups have established one-to-one 
communication with individuals in these institutions by spending great deal of time and 
effort. The senior staff of one UK-based environmental group demonstrates the 
emphasis of the similarity between the ‘relationship and credibility building’ and 
‘putting bricks into an edifice’ (RSPB 2000). Namely, these non-governmental groups 
investigate all possible opportunities for them to reach their targets.  In addition, the 
same person continued saying that his group searched for a long-term benefit, and he 
                                                                                                                                          
to comply with earlier Court rulings. Failure to do so could result in substantial fines 
being imposed on these Member States. Spain, Ireland, Austria and Greece are to be 
referred to the Court of Justice for a number of breaches of the two Directives” for 
further information see European Commission, “Wild Birds and Habitats Directives: 
Commission takes legal action against eight Member States”, http://europa.eu.int, 
IP/04/128, Brussels, 29 Jan. 2004 
 
25
 For further information see European Commission, “Wild Birds and Habitats 
Directives: Commission takes legal action against eight Member States”, IP/04/128, 
Brussels, 29 Jan. 2004 
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added that the all these attempts have borne fruit, that is to say, the interaction between 
these environmental groups and EU level policy makers has improved over time.   
In addition, some of the UK-based environmental groups have set up the ‘edifice’ 
so strongly in that they have strong linkages with the European Parliament as well as the 
Commission. For example, both the RSPB and WWF-UK have hired permanent 
parliamentary liaison officers. Moreover, WWF-UK tends to be in close contact with 
the British MEPS and especially those with nature conservation sites (that is, protected 
sites under the Birds and Habitats Directives) in their term of office.26  
Moreover, Britain is a special case due to the fact that functions that are 
performed primarily by government agencies in most countries are fulfilled by private 
bodies in Britain (Lowe and Goyder 1983). These include the National Trust, 
independent from government and based on charity, which purchase amenity land and 
historic buildings to present them for public use; and the Royal Society for Nature 
Conservation (RSNC), registered charity, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) which buys land to conserve as nature reserves. The RSNC helps English 
Nature, government agency, on the management of the sites of special scientific interest 
(SSSIs) which are areas of protected wildlife habitat. RSPB and National Trust are also 
the most prominent of the insider groups, emphasize their own direct practical 
contributions to conservation rather that a lobbying role (Carter and Lowe 1998:27). 
Consistent with these, as it was mentioned before, the UK government chooses 
the RSBP as leading partner for the biodiversity project. In line with this role, it 
campaigns and collaborates on policy process with government in order to put pressure 
on the UK to reach its biodiversity commitments coming from the CBD. Moreover, this 
kind of interaction has not been established just between the government and RSPB, but 
also it cooperate with other organizations in partnerships in order to improve 
invertebrate protection and in this network of coordination with partnerships, it has 
established 'Action for Invertebrates', with Butterfly Conservation, English Nature and 
Bug Life.27 Moreover, the RSPB’s role in halting the loss of biodiversity in the UK can 
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not be denied. According to them, ‘they will continue to work with and encourage 
Government to achieve this ambitious target in partnership with other organizations in 
BirdLife International to achieve this target at a European level’.28 
Another important role is taken by the English Nature in the biodiversity 
conservation process and the implementation phase. In their targets, the designation and 
management of SSSIs and the protection of priority species through the Species 
Recovery Programme plays crucial role. With National Nature Reserves, they present 
public an opportunity to have a say in England at first hand. They work for deepening of 
public awareness and appreciation of the countryside by supporting the management of 
BAP targets.29  
Moreover, it is seen that, the biodiversity policy arena motivates environmental 
groups to work in collaboration. For example, the LINK (Wildlife and Countryside 
Link) is this kind of network in which the environmental voluntary organizations in the 
UK come together on their common aims namely, the conservation and enjoyment of 
the natural and historic environment. Their Biodiversity Task Force (BTF) plans to be 
another ‘watchdog’ of the biodiversity policy in the UK by influencing and monitoring 
the development of the UK Biodiversity Partnership and to guarantee the UK 
Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) is fully delivered as a key strategic mechanism for UK 
conservation.30 In line with these aims, BTF tries to make its actions more concrete with 
some kind of initiations. For example, in January-March 2006, the LINK members have 
prepared a leaflet/poster to increase the awareness of the 2010 target to halt biodiversity 
loss by focusing mostly on the key decision-makers. This leaflet summarized what the 
2010 target to halt biodiversity means, and which kinds of steps can be taken to reach 
this aim over the next four years. Moreover, they not only let it go at that initiative, but 
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 For further information, English Nature, “Biodiversity Action Plans. English Nature’s 
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also in early March, LINK representatives has visited the Biodiversity Minister, Jim 
Knight MP, to explain the aims of 2010 leaflet.31  
The attempts are not limited to such examples witnessed at national policy arena. 
There are also reactions coming from the international environmental organizations to 
put pressure on incorrect decisions regarding biodiversity concerns taken by the UK 
government. For example, in 2004, the environmental organisation Friends of the Earth 
has protested the government on its decision to honor a controversial road which has 
destroyed one of the UK's top wildlife sites with the Prime Minister's "Better Public 
Building Award". The summary of the conflict aroused from the A650 Bingley Relief 
Road in West Yorkshire that was opened in December 2003 following several years of 
objections by environmentalists and local people. Related to this problem, Friends of 
the Earth Transport spokesperson Tony Bosworth mentions that the incredible attitude 
of the government by giving an award for design of this road by ignoring the disaster 
that this road had created in Britain's top wildlife sites. According to same 
spokesperson: ‘Its destruction of Bingley South Bog, a recognized Site of Special 
Scientific Interest, goes directly against Government policy to protect SSSIs and the 
road itself hasn't even provided the transport solution it promised - all it has done is 
move congestion to elsewhere in the area, exactly what opponents of the road 
predicted’.32  
Nevertheless, the national governments are not always in the position that 
ignoring the considerations of environmental groups and they are supporting the 
projects related to biodiversity concerns of the EU. As expressed before, LIFE Nature is 
one of the most pivotal financial instruments of the EU environment support 
instruments. In line with the aims of this support mechanism, member states build some 
projects on habitats and species under threat and so under EU importance by forming 
some management plans for some pilot areas. While doing these, they also pay attention 
to the linkages between biodiversity and other sectors such as agriculture, tourism, 
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32For further information see Friends of Earth, “Prime Minister Gives Award to road 
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forestry, water management that impacts on the Natura 2000 network of ecologically 
essential areas.  
Thus, in 1999, the UK government agencies under partnership principle runs a 
project related to the conservation of river habitats in that responsibles of government 
on water quality and protection of fresh-water habitats aim to establish, first, project 
objectives. As regards, they set up strategies for seven rivers in Scotland, Wales and 
England, designated as pSCI, with a total length of 872 km. In the boundaries of this 
study, the essential points, need to mention, are related to the coordination and 
collaboration that the responsibles establish.  
The management plans in this project zoomed in Natura 2000 targets and 
inaugurating partnerships among statutory authorities, fisheries interests and land 
owners in a ‘multilevel interactions cycle’ in order to depict the main risks to the sites 
and species and to constitute an action programme. In line with these, the River 
Conservation Strategy was developed with many studies on scientific data gathered 
from experts, including government and non-governmental agencies. Some tools for 
monitoring and indicators on these habitats and species under danger and one of the 
main outcomes of the project were the publication “Developing River Conservation 
Strategies: Model Guidance for Special Areas of Conservation”. This publication was 
significant in the meaning that it was promoting the ways on how to engage 
stakeholders and organize an appropriate consultation process regarding the 
management plans.33  
In conclusion, all plans, programmes, and projects taking biodiversity priorities 
into consideration stress on the style of working by indicating the significance of 
cooperation between all related actors. As it is seen, there is some sort of ‘check and 
balance’ mechanism between the international arenas, EU institutions, central 
governments and subnational and non-governmental actors. This can be seen some sort 
of ‘informal agreement’ that all stakeholders are signed between themselves. Because, 
they all know that the issues related to the all parts of the life, these are the Community 
issues in the EU for example, need to work together and this consciousness push the 
member states and all non-governmental organizations to work in collaboration in a 
policy process cycle.  
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III.3. Conclusions 
 
 
 
All these arguments on the policy process of biodiversity in the UK demonstrates 
that the policy network in general, including decision making, policy implementation, 
and aftermath of the implementation regarding legal observation on the appropriateness 
of policy implementation in member states, necessitates multi-actor activity. Moreover, 
this activity is in a cyclical mode in that previous process is affecting the following one. 
That’s to say in the cycle, feedbacks of the processes are impacting one another and also 
all actors work in cooperation and coordination due to the necessity of working 
together. Furthermore, this policy process establishes on the willingness and so 
consciousness of the member states.   
Thus, Britain can be defined as one of these member states that contributes to the 
multilevel and multi-actor based interactions cycle related to biodiversity policy. Some 
defines it as multi-level governance, but whatever its name the EU policy processes 
reminding us some sort of definite picture of multilevel interactions cycle and the EU 
plays fundamental role in promoting this development. The essentiality of the EU in this 
game comes from its nature in that member states agree on the obligations emerge from 
the responsibility of being a member of this kind of structure. The degree of power 
grasped by the EU institutions, central governments or some other actors in the ‘game’ 
can be discussed by analyzing the outcomes of the policies in that the policies are 
shaped by the side which holds the most critical competencies. However, regarding the 
aim of this study, the essential thing to indicate was to demonstrate what sort of network 
is constituted on what motivations. The EU biodiversity conservation issue is such a 
policy that all related players have to be in the game by influencing the policy process 
with differing degrees but the in the end the picture is multilevel interactions cycle. 
Moreover, member states are among the most crucial actors, in our example the UK, 
and they also stimulating the development of this process.  It is seen that the UK is in 
itself a multilevel polity, although the central state is the most dominant actor in this 
multilevelness, but it is/has to in connection with other actors in subnational arena. They 
are all playing in the domestic, national, EU level, and international arena. They all 
realize the necessity of this.  
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Consistently, the UK is at so critical point that it has to establish this cooperation 
among all relevant actors. As known, multilevel policy-making and implementation 
emerge at the time actors from wide variety of levels are interdependent in executing 
their targets and have to coordinate their policies. According to Scharpf (2000), this 
coordination can be established only with reciprocal adaptation, competition, 
hierarchical steering or negotiation. It is a negotiation process in that UK government 
has to agree to some degree with other actors. If not, the main requirement of the 
membership is not met by the government, and so it is encounter with opposition in 
changing degrees. The check and balance is so clear in the EU structure/system in that 
some governing functions are shifting from the centre to the negotiating networks 
encompassing governments (national, subnational, and local) as well as private actors 
(firms, interest groups etc.) as well as representatives of civil society (such as non-
governmental organizations [NGOs]).(Börzel and Risse, 2001:5).34  
  After especially mid-1980s, with the effects of increasing environmental 
awareness in the EU, the UK tended to focus on environmental issues different from the 
past. This awareness also came from the digestion of the membership and being adapted 
to the EU rules and regulations more than past. For example, English regionalism 
increased rapidly due to the fact that the regions have learned to profit by the EU 
resources to develop themselves. In this learning environment, the UK government has 
understood the need to work with these strengthening regions. Some constitutional 
changes have done to respond the needs of these regions. Devolution process has been 
initiated. The Labor Government has tested this devolution programme and become 
closer to multilevel and multi-actor interactions cycle.  
In addition, for example Regional Development Agencies and consultative 
Regional Chambers were established in the English regions. Although this sort of 
                                                
34
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institutional attempts were not fully satisfied English regionalists, but these initiations 
were seen as a ‘critical momentum’ for the regional governance and as Burch and 
Gomez mentioned ‘provided a new platform from which regional players could engage 
with a far wider range of European issues, such as enlargement, transport and 
environmental policy’ (Burch and Gomez, 2004: 12). The subnational actors of the 
biodiversity policy game have learned to play on new ground by using the partnership 
opportunities and began to put pressure on government. It is so clear that many 
environmental groups have been working in the arena of negotiation with other 
subnational actors, government and the EU.  
As Bache highlights, the major contribution of the EU partnership requirement 
that motivate more subnational participation, was, ‘over time, it broke down barriers to 
inter-agency working for many in British local government, who came to see it more as 
an opportunity than a threat.’(Bache 2005:10). The overall picture at all levels, 
subnational, supranational and governmental, has gained in this game. While British 
polity has entered into new and unreturnable process of being on the core of interactions 
network of policy processes, on the other hand, the English subnational actors have 
indisputably been empowered in the past two decades. (Bache 2005:12). EU has 
motivated all actors by promoting them to work on different policy arenas with different 
actors. That’s to say the cycles of the policies are interlinked on cross-sectors and the 
actors have also realized the cause and effects between the different policy areas, so 
began to work in intersecting policy areas. These brought the idea that in fact there is no 
one policy area that is apart from the others and has only one policy cycle in it. 
Environmental policy has effect on different policy sectors and also there are many 
other policy sectors that have impacts on environment.  That’s to say, this reciprocity 
brings the intersecting of policy areas. Moreover, inside the environmental policy, 
biodiversity conservation is such a policy area that affects many policy spheres and 
wide variety of actors. They are all in all and have to work in intersecting zones. This 
can not be ignored and brings shift from government to governance and ‘shifting style 
of politics towards consensualism’ (Bache 2005:13). In the future, this ‘governance’ 
trend will continue and this process can not turn into ‘government’ again due to rapidly 
increasing amounts of actors entering into the play. For example, the increase in role 
and numbers of quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations) in Britain 
is mentioned under the post-1997 Labor government (HC 209, 1999).  
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Moreover, the relationship between these actors in policy processes can be seen 
like a symbiotic interaction that the all parts are benefiting from the cooperation done 
with one another. For example, one of the essential features of policy-making of 
biodiversity conservation issue around the two biodiversity directives can be seen as the 
symbiotic relationship between EU institutions, especially the Commission and the EP, 
and the environmental groups. In that situation, witnessed that these institutions were in 
need of expertise and political support from environmental groups in the face of 
opposition from some counter-lobby groups and some member states with pro-hunting 
traditions.(Fairbrass and Jordan 2003:104). On the other hand, these environmental 
groups were presenting these expertise and political support for the sake of reaching 
their own targets on biodiversity issue.  
Moreover, the close personal relations between the individuals in institutions and 
environmental groups was essential because on the one hand the institutions are 
gathering necessary information in short time regarding policies, on the other hand  the 
NGOs benefited from the political opportunities emerging from the EU-level 
institutional necessities, so far as their resources would allow. For example, the RSBP, 
as one of the foremost British environmental group, can find opportunity to work at all 
levels, national, subnational, EU level, simultaneously to exploit all existing channels to 
reach its aims and so maximize its success. Regarding the Biodiversity issue, it can be 
exactly argued that, the RSPB seems to reach its aims and have impact on biodiversity 
strategies of the central government.  One campaigner from the WWF-UK explains that: 
 
   we do, very frequently, consciously consider on what we do…every time we stick a complaint 
onto Europe about a particular site or about transposition, we know that we want the Commission 
to put pressure on the UK government, and the way we use that main sort of action, we made sure 
that we nursed our relationship with the Commission on that because we knew that they were 
concerned themselves…but they weren’t in a position, without the information, to do anything 
about it…so that’s why we made sure they had copies of every single site that we believed 
qualified and why 
 
In summary, this symbiotic relationship based on multilevel and multi-actor 
interactions in that all parts contribute and influence the process at different times and 
different points. All parties are aware of this fact and in this acceptance; they learn to 
work in collaboration with consciousness. The governance trend impacted on all these 
actors and out of the Community institutions and central governments, the play arena is 
extended and including new player day-by-day in a more mature way. That’s to say, the 
newly added partners of the policy processes in the biodiversity policy is increasing 
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everyday and the relationship between the policy levels are getting more mature than 
past. This multilevel interactions cycle, therefore, covering all components of the puzzle 
and resulting in, in our example it is a biodiversity policy, a policy process. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This dissertation has attempted to glance at the EU policy processes from the 
window of ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ with a deductionist style of 
studying. The hypothesis was that especially after the Single European Market 
formation, ‘governance trend’ in the EU has led all related actors to enter into policy 
processes with the effect of learning processes developed as time passes and this newly 
emerging political style has opened these stakeholders new channels to influence the 
direction of the decisions taken and implementations of these decisions in the EU. In 
addition, the appearance of this argument of ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ 
has been based on the arguments of multilevel governance approach. In addition, liberal 
intergovernmentalism was revisited due to the fact that liberal intergovernmentalism has 
discussed the importance of domestic politics and supranational institutions, however it 
also paid attention only history making decisions, not daily functioning of EU. Today, 
general policy game in the EU is based on daily functioning of the EU and this picture 
is that EU, today, is functioning on the interactions cycle including multilevels and 
actors, and this network can be seen easily, so discernible situation.  
While this dissertation attempting to verify the existence of this network, 
multilevel governance approach has been so crucial inspiration that demonstrates the 
existence of forgotten actors in the play out of EU institutions and central governments 
of Member States. They were sub-state actors entering into EU policy game after 
especially the mid-1980s and becoming effective in policy processes. Consistent with 
these, multilevel governance approach has constructed itself by stressing on the 
changing structure of decision making competencies that has begun to be shared by 
actors at different levels rather than monopolized by national governments, significant 
loss of control for individual governments on newly emerging collective decision 
making processes, and finally the significance of sub-state actors and supranational 
bodies in addition to national governments.  
Consistently, our stress on multilevel governance approach is to demonstrate the 
general picture of EU policy processes based on ‘discernible multilevel interactions 
cycle’. In addition to the arguments of multilevel governance approach, the dissertation 
testified that today EU is functioning on the network of interactions amongst central 
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governments, EU bodies including institutions, working groups, agencies and sub-state 
actors, non-state actors and so on. In the dissertation, one policy area has been chosen, 
namely biodiversity conservation, with the aim of demonstrating this interactions 
network as we called ‘cycle’. It is cycle because policy process is not a linear situation 
that is ending at some point. There are always some feedbacks influencing other 
processes in one policy area. For example, pre-decision making affects decision making 
and it is affecting implementation. The process does not end here and post-
implementation processes affects member states to change their decisions and continue 
to implement. This interactions cycle is verified in the biodiversity policy process but 
we clearly witnessed its functioning in our case study of the UK. 
The UK, after membership, has begun to transform its policy making and 
implementation style with some institutional and constitutional changes. This pressure 
of transformation has come from the adaptation to the EU policy processes. The 
Westminster and Whitehall relations have changed and local government arrangements 
have come to the agenda. Moreover, devolution has been so significant due to the 
constitutional shifts in the UK by taking into account of the English regions. The 
devolution of significant powers to the Scottish Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the 
Wales and Northern Ireland Assemblies might be seen as signaling a shift in power and 
influence away from central government toward the subnational level. Regions, after 
all, are increasingly seen as the optimal level at which institutional networks and 
institutional thickness may be developed - small enough to allow for face-to-face 
contact upon which trust and cooperation are built, but large enough to permit 
economies of scale and scope (Amin and Thrift 1994).  
Furthermore, by combining these with the biodiversity conservation policy, it has 
been realized that the UK has experienced the values of NGOs. This has also appeared 
with some sort of a pressure coming from international and domestic political arenas. 
After we analyzed this rather slowly changing nature of British politics, our hypotheses 
on the existence of ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ has been tested. The 
outcome that we reached is that rather than focusing on the factors that are pushing 
integration further as grand European integration theories has mentioned, there is a 
necessity to gaze at the EU and to ask ‘how it seems to function’. The answer to this 
question will display the picture of ‘multilevel interactions cycle’ that can be clearly 
observable.  
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The biodiversity policy has been chosen due to its own complex nature of 
interactions between different interest groups, namely business associations, industrial, 
agricultural and environmental interest group activities on environmental policies. It 
could be fertile land to realize how these groups are interconnected each other and also 
to EU institutions and central governments. Whether these interactions have effects on 
policy processes in the EU is searched for. The learning process that especially has 
offered opportunities to these actors to play the policy game in the EU has 
demonstrated. Moreover, their effectiveness has seen in all parts of the policy process of 
biodiversity conservation issue. All stakeholders have been working in coordination, 
collaboration and cooperation to differing degrees to reach their own targets.  
After this sort of a general outlook to the existence of ‘discernible multilevel 
interactions cycle’ in the biodiversity policy arena, in our case study of the adaptation of 
the UK to the EU, it is realized that the activities of all related stakeholders in the 
biodiversity policy process has played the same game. The UK’s newly and slowly 
changing political behavior has been analyzed and its own learning process has been 
discussed. The outcome is again the similar that the UK, after the membership, has 
begun to shift its centralist tendency and learned to digest the existence of the non-state 
actors and the EU institutions in the policy game. The membership has some obligations 
on the country’s decision making and implementation behavior and in this learning 
process, it accepted to exist together with all related actors.  
This acceptance in fact verifies our hypothesis that the ‘governance trend’ in the 
EU has affected all policy making and implementation styles in the Member States, and 
stakeholders in EU policy game has understood that they are all existing ‘because of’ 
and ‘for’ each other.  This trend can not be irreversible and it continues by absorbing 
new actors to the game. This picture is so the ‘discernible multilevel interactions cycle’ 
and explains the EU policy processes so the nature of the EU.  
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